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R O B E R T  C .  P O S T  &  J E N N I F E R  E .  R O T H M A N  
The First Amendment and the Right(s) of Publicity 
abstract.  The right of publicity protects persons against unauthorized uses of their identi-
ty, most typically their names, images, or voices. The right is in obvious tension with freedom of 
speech. Yet courts seeking to reconcile the right with the First Amendment have to date produced 
only a notoriously confused muddle of inconsistent constitutional doctrine. In this Article, we 
suggest a way out of the maze. We propose a relatively straightforward framework for analyzing 
how the right of publicity should be squared with First Amendment principles. 
 At the root of contemporary constitutional confusion lies a failure to articulate the precise 
state interests advanced by the right of publicity. We seek to remedy this deficiency by disaggre-
gating four distinct state interests that the right of publicity is typically invoked to protect. We 
argue that in any given case the right of publicity is characteristically invoked to protect (one or 
more) of these four interests: the value of a plainti# ’s performance, the commercial value of a 
plainti# ’s identity, the dignity of a plainti#, or the autonomous personality of a plainti#. 
 Plainti#s’ interests in their identity must always be weighed against defendants’ constitu-
tional interests in their speech. We therefore isolate three constitutional kinds of communication, 
each with a distinct form of First Amendment protection. A defendant’s misappropriation of a 
plainti# ’s identity can occur in public discourse, in commercial speech, or in what we call “com-
modities.” We then discuss how constitutional protections for these three kinds of speech should 
intersect with the four di#erent interests that right of publicity claims are typically invoked to 
protect. 
 The upshot is not a mechanical algorithm for producing correct constitutional outcomes, 
but an illumination of the constitutional stakes at issue in any given right of publicity action. We 
hope that by carefully surfacing the constitutional and policy stakes that beset the conflict be-
tween right(s) of publicity and the First Amendment, we have sketched a map that might sub-
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introduction
The right of publicity is broadly defined as a state-law tort designed to pre-
vent unauthorized uses of a person’s identity that typically involve appropria-
tions of a person’s name, likeness, or voice.1 Because the right of publicity re-
stricts what can be said, shown, or heard, it potentially conflicts with freedom
of speech. Judicial analysis of this conflict is notoriously incoherent and incon-
sistent.
The essence of the problem is that unauthorized uses of identity are regu-
lated for many different reasons that are frequently jumbled together in vague
state proscriptions enforced either through common-law torts or legislation.
Cogent First Amendment analysis requires careful specification of the precise
state interests that justify government restrictions of speech. It should come as
no surprise then that courts have failed to articulate any single First Amend-
ment test adequate to encompass the many distinct legal interests that the con-
temporary right of publicity jams together.
In most of its formulations, the right of publicity refers to a distinct tor-
tious act, which is broadly defined as the appropriation of a plaintiff ’s identity
for a defendant’s “use or benefit.”2 But a single tortious act can impair multiple
distinct legal interests. Consider an example drawn from Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell: if I accuse you of having sex with your mother, I can damage the es-
teem in which you are held in your community, and so commit the tort of def-
amation. Or I can specifically intend to cause you emotional harm, and so
commit the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Or I can assault
your dignity by revealing deeply held secrets, and so commit the tort of public
disclosure of private facts.3 Although these different torts arise out of the same
1. Although initially limited to the use of a person’s name and likeness, the law now allows lia-
bility for uses of other indicia of “identity.” See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d
1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a right of publicity claim could lie for the use of a
robot that merely brought the plaintiff to mind); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,
463-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing a publicity claim based on the use of a vocal performance
that sounded similar to the plaintiff ’s voice); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing a publicity claim on the basis of the use of a red
car associated with the plaintiff ); see also JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR THE PUBLIC WORLD 88-96 (2018) (tracing the expansion of the
right of publicity beyond name and likeness).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
3. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (holding that such an accusation
asserted as parody in a magazine was protected by the First Amendment from an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim; the plaintiff had also brought false light and defama-
tion claims).
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act, they each possess different elements that track the specific harm the tort is
designed to redress.
The underlying difficulty with the right of publicity is that it prohibits con-
duct without specifying the particular harm the tort seeks to address.4 The re-
sulting imprecision has encouraged the tort to expand uncontrollably, becom-
ing, in the words of one commentator, like the “Wild West.”5 Not only has
litigation involving the right of publicity greatly increased,6 but disparities in
defining the right across different jurisdictions have also grown.7 In some
states, the right is confined to commercial contexts, and in others it is not.8 In
some states, plaintiffs asserting the right must establish that they have com-
mercially valuable identities, and in others they do not.9 In some states, the
right is oriented toward economic injury, and in others it encompasses injuries
that are both economic and personal.10 Because the harms redressed by the tort
are uncertain and ill-defined, so too is First Amendment treatment of the tort.
This has real and important consequences. Those who wish to create ex-
pressive works that incorporate the identities of actual people, or who wish to
post images and comments about actual people online, are bereft of reliable
and foreseeable protections for the exercise of essential First Amendment
4. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1 (West 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.770 (2019);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2019); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 349-52 (Ct. App. 1983); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am.
Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705-06 (Ga. 1982).
5. Brian D. Wassom, Identity and Its Consequences: The Importance of Self-Image, Social Media,
and the Right of Publicity to IP Litigators, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING KEY DECISIONS AND EFFECTIVELY LITIGATING
IP CASES 37, 43 (Aspatore Books ed. 2012); see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 61-62, 87-97.
6. In 1977, 9 states had some version of a statutory right of publicity or appropriation tort. To-
day, that number has swelled to 25. The vast majority of states without a statutory right rec-
ognize some version of a common-law right. See ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY, https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com [https://perma.cc/78DR-NBFA]
(providing analysis of different state publicity laws). To get a rough perspective on the
growth in decisions involving the right of publicity over the last forty years, there were ap-
proximately 18 published right of publicity decisions in the 1970s, 53 in the 1980s, 63 in the
1990s, 105 in the 2000s, and 112 in the 2010s. These numbers likely underestimate the num-
ber of opinions because they are based on our survey of published decisions on Westlaw on-
ly locating cases using the search term “right of publicity” in the synopsis/digest for the cas-
es. The uptick in right of publicity filings has been far greater.
7. On state-to-state variations in the right, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 96-98; and ROTH-
MAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, supra note 6.
8. See infra notes 23-24, 29-32 and accompanying text.
9. See id.
10. See id. As we will discuss, in most states the right of publicity addresses both market-based
and personality interests.
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rights. Courts have disagreed about the circumstances under which the First
Amendment protects the use of well-known persons’ identities in video
games,11 news reporting,12 posters,13 board and card games,14 prints,15 comic
books,16 merchandise,17 and movies.18 The tort’s jagged and unpredictable
reach chills speech in extensive and immeasurable ways.
11. Compare In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1284
(9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a First Amendment defense in the context of alleged uses of ath-
letes’ likenesses in a video game), with Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., 42 Media L. Rep.
2740 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding that the First Amendment insulated a video game maker
from liability for using the former dictator’s likeness in a video game).
12. Compare Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (rejecting a First
Amendment defense in the context of a nightly news broadcast that showed plaintiff ’s per-
formance), with Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 997 (Colo. 2001) (re-
jecting a right of publicity claim when the use of a person’s identity was in a newsletter, and
the use was deemed “newsworthy”).
13. Compare Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that a right of publicity claim in the context of a poster of a famous quarterback
was barred by the First Amendment), and Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d
501, 509 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (denying a right of publicity claim when the defendant sold a post-
er with the comedian’s likeness), with Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090,
1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing a right of publicity claim and rejecting a First Amendment
defense to the use of Elvis Presley’s name and image in memorial posters), rev’d on other
grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), and Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d. 1004, 1014-15
(App. Div. 1981) (allowing a right of publicity claim in the context of a poster displaying an
image of the plaintiff-model).
14. Compare Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 147 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(allowing a right of publicity claim in the context of a board game about Howard Hughes),
with Aldrin v. Topps Co., No. CV-10-09939, 2011 WL 4500013, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27,
2011) (allowing a First Amendment defense in the context of a trading-card game).
15. Compare Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810-11 (Cal. 2001) (re-
jecting a First Amendment defense in the context of a drawing of comedians sold in multiple
lithographed copies and on t-shirts), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936-
38 (6th Cir. 2003) (allowing a First Amendment defense in the context of prints of a paint-
ing of a famous golfer sold in multiple copies).
16. Compare Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Mo. 2003) (rejecting a First Amend-
ment defense to the use of a variation on a hockey player’s name in a comic book), with
Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 480 (Cal. 2003) (concluding that the First Amendment
protects an author from liability for using a variation on plaintiffs’ names and likenesses in a
comic book).
17. Compare Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 1256,
1263-65 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (allowing a First Amendment defense to the use of the civil-rights
hero’s name and image on a mass-produced plaque), aff ’d on other grounds, 812 F.3d 824 (11th
Cir. 2016), with Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) (rejecting a First Amendment defense in the context of the
sale of mass-produced busts of the civil-rights leader).
18. Compare Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t. Servs., LLC, 47 N.Y.S.3d 769, 772 (App. Div. 2017) (al-
lowing a right of publicity claim to proceed in the context of a docudrama), with De Havil-
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Our hope is to ameliorate these deficiencies in right of publicity law much
as William Prosser did sixty years ago for the right of privacy. He looked at the
“haystack in a hurricane” of privacy law and sought to make sense of it by dis-
tinguishing four distinct kinds of privacy torts.19 In this Article, we seek to per-
form an analogous service for the right of publicity and, in the process, to clari-
fy constitutional analysis of the tort.
We identify four distinct interests that the right of publicity typically seeks
to vindicate. The disaggregation of these interests is an essential first step in
addressing the current confusion because each of these four interests requires
its own specific First Amendment analysis. As a helpful heuristic, one might
even go so far as to imagine each of these interests as embodied in its own dis-
tinct tort, with its own set of prima facie elements.
For purposes of clarity, we denominate these four ideal torts as the right of
performance, the right of commercial value, the right of control, and the right of dig-
nity. These torts protect, respectively, plaintiffs’ interests in controlling the use
of their performances, in preserving the commercial value of their identity, in
protecting the autonomy of their personality, and in maintaining the dignity of
their person. In any given right of publicity action, one or more of these four
distinct interests may be at stake.20 When taken together, we believe that these
four interests encompass the vast majority of cases presently brought to remedy
unauthorized uses of identity under state right of publicity laws.
In Part I, we define these four different rights of publicity. In Part II, we de-
scribe the present sorry state of First Amendment analysis with respect to right
of publicity claims. In Part III, we demonstrate that the clarity of First
Amendment analysis will be much improved if publicity claims are disaggre-
gated into the four interests that we identify. Though difficult constitutional
judgments will of course remain, our hope is that our proposed framework will
produce more reliable, predictable, and sound constitutional outcomes than the
bedlam that presently prevails. We hope also to offer a useful vantage for fur-
ther critique and reform of the underlying substantive tort.
land v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 647 (Ct. App. 2018) (rejecting a right of
publicity claim on First Amendment grounds in the context of a docudrama television se-
ries).
19. William L. Prosser, The Right to Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 407 (1960).
20. Unauthorized uses of a person’s identity sometimes also implicate interests that are protect-
ed by other torts. Plaintiffs may sometimes allege, for example, that the unauthorized use of
their identity has placed them in a false light, defamed them, or infringed a trademark. See,
e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 915 (bringing trademark, unfair competition, and right of pub-
licity claims against an artist who made prints from his painting of the plaintiff winning the
Master’s Tournament); De Havilland, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 625 (bringing both false light and
right of publicity claims in a lawsuit arising out of a miniseries character based on the plain-
tiff that used her name and personality).
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i . the four rights of publicity
In this Part, we identify four different kinds of right of publicity claims.
Each concerns a distinct interest that a plaintiff might seek to vindicate in a
right of publicity action. Each of these four interests is visible in contemporary
right of publicity litigation. In an ideal world, the protection of each interest
would require its own set of prima facie elements and First Amendment analy-
sis. But regardless of whether the protection of these interests is formally sepa-
rated into distinct torts, cogent jurisprudential and constitutional scrutiny is
not possible until these interests have been disaggregated and separately evalu-
ated.21
American law has protected plaintiffs’ commercial and personality interests
in their identity for more than a century. As one of us has documented, this
body of law long predates Jerome Frank’s and Melville Nimmer’s consideration
of the “right of publicity” in the 1950s.22 Justifications for barring the unau-
thorized use of identity presently encompass the protection of both market-
based and personality-based interests.23 Although some courts (and scholars)
21. See Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 891, 894, 928-32
(2017) (observing that one of the foundational problems for the right of publicity is that it is
treated as a unitary right, when it “is really multiple rights”). Dividing the right of publicity
into four distinct torts would be especially useful in guiding decisions about the adjectival
aspects of the tort, like inheritability and transferability, which to date have been particularly
controversial.
22. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 11-29 (“Concerns over the misappropriation of identity and un-
wanted publicity were not novel when the right of publicity purportedly emerged in the
1950s. To the contrary, they were long-standing and in large part the inciting incident for
the development of the right of privacy itself.”). What Frank and Nimmer added to the pic-
ture was the possibility that rights over one’s own identity could be transferable. See id. at
45-64, 68-71; see also Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953) (Frank, J.) (suggesting the existence of a transferable “right of publicity”); Mel-
ville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 221-23 (1954) (ad-
vocating for the adoption of a broad and alienable “right of publicity” in the wake of the
Haelan decision). It took decades after the decision in Haelan for courts even to consider the
possibility that a right of publicity might be something distinct from the right of privacy’s
appropriation tort. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 67-86.
23. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102-04 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a sing-
er’s economic and personal injuries stemming from the use of a similar-sounding voice un-
der California’s common-law right of publicity); Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 753
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (suggesting that claims under section 3344 of the California Civil Code
“may present [as] one of two theories”—one based on commercial exploitation, and the oth-
er on the basis of “injury to the feelings” (citing Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr.
2d 790, 792 (Ct. App. 1993))); Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d 622, 625 (Ga.
2013) (recognizing that Georgia’s right of publicity protects against both dignitary and mon-
etary injuries); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1977) (treating the right of publicity and appropriation as a single tort and noting that this
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distinguish the privacy tort of appropriation (which they define as protecting
personality interests in identity) from the tort of right of publicity (which they
define as protecting the market value of identity),24 many states treat the two
torts interchangeably.25 And even in states that claim to distinguish between
the appropriation and right of publicity torts, the elements of the two causes of
action are frequently identical. As the Supreme Court of Missouri candidly ob-
served about that state’s purportedly distinct causes of action, “the elements of
the two torts are essentially the same.”26 Because both torts are in fact directed
tort protects against both “mental distress” and economic injuries). We note that although
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition takes a narrower view of the right of publicity
as primarily a tort of unfair competition, it too describes the tort as protecting both market-
based and personality-based interests. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (noting that “the right of publicity protects an individual’s
interest in personal dignity and autonomy” and the person’s “commercial value”).
24. See Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1000 (Colo. 2001) (noting that
while some courts “follow Prosser’s formulation of the tort and provide relief for both per-
sonal and commercial harm,” others “partially reject[] the Prosser formulation, choosing to
distinguish claims for injury to personal feelings caused by an unauthorized use of a plain-
tiff ’s identity (‘right of privacy’) from claims seeking redress for pecuniary damages caused
by an appropriation of the commercial value of the identity (‘right of publicity’)”); Crump
v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E. 2d 70, 85 n.6 (W. Va. 1983) (“The right of privacy pro-
tects individual personality and feelings, the right of publicity protects the commercial value
of a name or likeness.”).
25. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 458-60 (Ohio 1976) (ex-
plaining that Ohio’s right of privacy encompasses a claim for the “appropriation of a plain-
tiff ’s name and likeness” and that “this aspect of privacy” is termed “the right of publicity”),
rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 565-66 (1977) (understanding the plaintiff ’s state right
of privacy claim as one for the violation of the right of publicity); see also Prima v. Darden
Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 346 (D.N.J. 2000) (“Louisiana law . . . does not expressly
provide for a right of publicity. Rather, courts in Louisiana have interpreted Louisiana’s right
of privacy to protect a person’s name or likeness from commercial exploitation.” (citing Pru-
dhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 396 (E.D. La. 1992))); Brinkley v. Ca-
sablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012 (App. Div. 1981). California law provides a telling exam-
ple of this. California’s statutory right of publicity for the living, which is now frequently
used to protect the commercial value of identity, was originally passed under the moniker of
“privacy” and created to provide ordinary citizens whose identity lacked commercial value
the opportunity to obtain statutory damages. Act of Nov. 22, 1971, ch. 1595, 1971 Cal. Stat.
3426 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344); ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 208 n.40; Letter from
Assemb. John Vasconcellos to Governor Ronald Reagan (Nov. 10, 1971) (on file with the
Governor’s Chaptered Bill File, California State Archives). Accordingly, the statutory codifi-
cation of the privacy-based appropriation tort and the right of publicity in California are
identical, as are the common-law versions of the torts, and both allow recovery of personal
and market-based injuries. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346-48 (Ct.
App. 1983); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (treat-
ing the privacy-based appropriation tort and the right of publicity as identical).
26. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003).
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at preventing unauthorized uses of identity, we shall in this Article treat both as
variants of a single overarching right of publicity.
The vagueness that envelops the right of publicity is exemplified by the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, which defines the tort of “Appropriation of Name or
Likeness” as follows: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy.”27 This definition focuses the tort of appropriation on the actions of a
defendant. It is silent about the nature of the plaintiff ’s interests it seeks to pro-
tect.28
The tort of appropriation is one of four privacy torts delineated in the Re-
statement (Second). In contrast to the other three privacy torts, appropriation
does not require a plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant has acted in a
“highly offensive” way.29 This omission is not accidental. “Highly offensive”
behavior violates basic community norms and is thus experienced as an assault
on dignity that is mortifying and degrading.30 But the Restatement (Second) did
not intend the appropriation tort merely to vindicate a plaintiff ’s dignity. In-
stead it formulated the tort to encompass all appropriations that can be said in
some sense to “benefit” a defendant, which literally include uses by biog-
raphers, historians, newspapers, credit-reporting agencies, publishers of direc-
tories, and so on.
In an effort to cabin this intolerable overbreadth, many states have imposed
additional affirmative elements on the tort. Several states, for example, require
that a plaintiff have a commercially valuable identity or that a defendant’s use
be for commercial purposes, for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of
trade.31 Yet these requirements usually neither require a showing of market
damages nor exclude showings of injuries to dignity.32
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see Prosser, supra note 19,
at 401-07. Many states have adopted the formulation of section 652C. California’s common-
law right of publicity, for example, requires a showing that (1) the defendant used the plain-
tiff ’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff ’s identity be for the defendant’s advantage,
commercially or otherwise; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the use; and (4) an injury re-
sulted. See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346; see also Dittmar, 34 P.3d at 1002 (adopting a simi-
lar formulation in Colorado law).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmts. a & d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
29. Compare id. §§ 652B, 652D, 652E, with id. § 652C.
30. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 961 (1989) [herein-
after Post, Social Foundations]; see also Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601, 616-26 (1990) [hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Dis-
course].
31. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/1 (West 2020); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 2019); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2020); see also Jennifer
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The tort’s failure to focus on the vindication of precise interests makes it
quite difficult to reconcile right of publicity claims with First Amendment pro-
tections. Consider, for example, that in 2001 the Supreme Court of Colorado
was certain that the tort of appropriation could not overcome “a First Amend-
ment privilege that permits the use of a plaintiff ’s name or likeness when that
use is made in the context of, and reasonably relates to, a publication concern-
ing a matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern.”33 Yet in 1977
the Supreme Court of the United States allowed a right of publicity claim to
proceed in the context of a presumptively newsworthy nightly news broad-
cast.34 The two cases can be reconciled only if the two courts were adjudicating
assertions of the right of publicity vindicating entirely distinct state interests, as
indeed they were.35
In this Part, we identify four different interests that right of publicity claims
typically seek to vindicate. These four interests concern the protection, respec-
tively, of performances, of the commercial value of identity, of the autonomy of
personality, and of the dignity of personality. In practice, plaintiffs may allege
harm on the basis of more than one of these interests in any given lawsuit. But
because each of these interests requires a distinct constitutional analysis, we
think it most helpful to imagine four ideal torts, each precisely oriented toward
the protection of a specific and singular interest.
A. The Right of Performance
We consider, first, what we call the right of performance, which we define as
a claim designed to authorize persons who create performances to protect those
performances from misappropriation. Broadly speaking, the right of perfor-
mance is violated when a defendant uses the performance of another without
consent.
E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use, and the Intellectual Property Quagmire, 101
VA. L. REV. 1929, 1950-55, 1959-64 (2015) (noting the variety and variability of right of pub-
licity provisions around commerciality).
32. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2020); Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012-13 (App. Div.
1981).
33. Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1003 (Colo. 2001).
34. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564, 566 (1977).
35. The Colorado Supreme Court was addressing a form of the right of publicity that sought to
prevent the “mental anguish” caused by the misappropriation of a plaintiff ’s identity,
Dittmar, 34 P.3d at 1002-03, whereas the United States Supreme Court in 1977 was discuss-
ing a form of the right of publicity designed to prevent misappropriations of a plaintiff ’s
performance, Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 564, 566, 569, 572-79.
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The right of performance is commonly asserted. Athletes sue to prevent the
broadcast of their matches;36 entertainers sue to prevent the broadcast of their
acts;37 announcers sue to prevent the reproduction of their commentary;38 ac-
tors sue to prevent unauthorized distribution of films in which they have ap-
peared;39 singers sue to prevent the recycling of their tracks.40
The only right of publicity claim ever explicitly considered by the Supreme
Court of the United States was a right of performance case—Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.41 The plaintiff was Hugo Zacchini, who performed
“the feat of being shot from a cannon into a net some 200 feet away. The entire
performance last[ed] about 15 seconds.”42 Zacchini objected when a news sta-
tion sought to film his act at an Ohio fair. Ignoring his objections, the news sta-
tion recorded his performance and subsequently broadcast the footage on the
nightly news. Zacchini complained that “the defendant showed and commer-
cialized the film of . . . [his] act without his consent and such conduct by the
defendant was unlawful appropriation of plaintiff ’s professional property.”43
The Supreme Court of Ohio conceptualized Zacchini’s claim as “one for in-
vasion of the right of privacy by appropriation,” which was synonymous under
36. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 1956); id. at 497
(Hastie, J., dissenting). Ettore was a boxer who attempted to block the rebroadcast of his
bout with Joe Louis. Ettore had agreed to the filming of his performance but had not agreed
to the use of his performance on television―a technology not contemplated when he agreed
to the filming and use of his performance. In his complaint, Ettore also claimed that the re-
broadcast had impaired his dignity by omitting his best round and thus painting him in a
negative light that reflected poorly on his boxing skills. See id. at 484 (majority opinion).
37. See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354 (1952).
38. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008); Ventura v. Titan Sports,
Inc., 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
39. See, e.g., Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2010); Fleet
v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Ct. App. 1996).
40. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); Armstrong v. Eagle
Rock Entm’t, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
41. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). We note that, arguably, the first right of publicity case heard by the Su-
preme Court was much earlier, in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911). In
that case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of New York’s right of privacy statute,
which is the same statute that established its right of publicity, in the context of a plaintiff ’s
objection to the use of a photograph of her on trading stamps without her consent. Id. at
505.
42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other
grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
43. Id. at 456. Zacchini’s complaint was broadly pled and did not specifically mention the right
of publicity, the right of privacy, or common-law copyright. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
app. at A49-A50, Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (No. 76-577).
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Ohio state law with its right of publicity.44 The court observed that “the fun-
damental wrong” addressed by the tort “is the appropriation for one’s self of
the benefits of another’s name, likeness, or identity, and the wrong is the same
whether or not that benefit is pecuniary.”45 The court observed that “[t]he de-
terminative question is . . . whether the defendant’s taking and use of the films of
plaintiff ’s act . . . constituted the appropriation of the defendant’s exclusive rights
to his own likeness and identity.”46
Although the rhetoric of the Ohio court seemed to conflate Zacchini’s right
to protect the value of his performance with a broader right to protect his identi-
ty, the decision specifically focused its analysis on the use of Zacchini’s perfor-
mance:
It is this right, a right of exclusive control over the publicity given to
his performances, which the plaintiff seeks to protect. For a performer,
this right is a valuable part of the benefit which may be attained by his
talents and efforts, and we think that this right is entitled to legal pro-
tection, contrary to the holding of some earlier cases.47
Zacchini’s act was not in a fixed form and thus was not copyrightable under
federal or state copyright laws.48 But the Ohio court concluded that even un-
fixed performances deserve legal protection. It sought to close this perceived
gap in copyright law’s coverage by recognizing Zacchini’s claim under the
state’s right of publicity.49
The Ohio court ultimately held that Zacchini’s legal rights were overridden
by the nightly news program’s First Amendment “privilege” to broadcast a film
of his act.50 The films shown by the program were presumptively newswor-
thy.51 “[T]he press has a privilege to report matters of legitimate public interest
44. Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 456, 460.
45. Id. at 458 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
46. Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 457 (concluding that the unfixed performance
was not copyrightable under state law, and that even if it had been, such protection would
have terminated upon the public performance). Copyright protection at the state level for
unpublished works was abolished with the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, Janu-
ary 1, 1978. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (1976) (codified as amended at
§ 101).
49. See SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977)) (noting that under Zacchi-
ni, “state law can protect [a] right of publicity in uncopyrighted performance”).
50. Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
51. Id. at 460-62.
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even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise private. . . . The
same privilege exists in cases where appropriation of a right of publicity is
claimed.”52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this constitutional holding.
It accepted, as it was required to do, the Ohio court’s conclusion that under
state law Zacchini possessed a “right to the publicity value of his perfor-
mance,”53 which had been compromised by the television station’s broadcast of
“his entire act and [display of] that film on television for the public to see and
enjoy.”54 But the Supreme Court differed with the Ohio court’s interpretation
of the First Amendment.
The Ohio court had applied constitutional precedents from cases involving
defamation and false light privacy-based claims, which the Supreme Court un-
derstood to be about protecting plaintiffs from dignitary harms.55 But digni-
tary harms were irrelevant to Zacchini’s claim. Instead the Court conceived of
Zacchini’s interest in his performance as a “proprietary” interest, the protection
of which was “closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law.”56
Ohio law protected “the right of the individual to reap the reward of his en-
deavors and [had] little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.”57
The Supreme Court observed:
The broadcast of a film of petitioner’s entire act poses a substantial
threat to the economic value of that performance. . . . Much of its eco-
nomic value lies in the “right of exclusive control over the publicity giv-
en to his performance”; if the public can see the act free on television, it
will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair. . . . [I]n this case, Ohio has
recognized what may be the strongest case for a “right of publicity”—
involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to en-
hance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation
of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in
the first place.58
Stressing the close analogy to copyright, the Supreme Court concluded that
“[t]he Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to
52. Id. at 461.
53. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565.
54. Id. at 569.
55. Id. at 573.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 575-76 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would
privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work with-
out liability to the copyright owner.”59
The Supreme Court properly based its First Amendment analysis on the
exact purpose of Ohio’s common-law tort. It extended legal protection specifi-
cally to reproductions of Zacchini’s “performance” of his cannonball act.60 Pre-
cisely put, the quarrel between Zacchini and the news station concerned control
over the distribution of Zacchini’s performance, not the use of his name or like-
ness. Zacchini may have used his identity to create the performance, but his
performance is conceptually distinct from his likeness and identity.
Zacchini’s performance is a discrete set of acts in space and time. Copyright
creates an analogous right to control a discrete, fixed expression that may con-
vey the personality of an author but that is distinct from the personality of that
author.61 Just as society desires to encourage the production and distribution of
works protected by copyright, so it may wish to encourage the creation of per-
formances, including those that may not be copyrightable because they are un-
fixed.62 “[T]he economic rationale for copyright law—that market failure
59. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575. The Justices in the majority were particularly concerned that allow-
ing a First Amendment defense in the case would give broadcasters the ability to broadcast
uncopyrighted works, such as some symphonies and sporting events, under the guise of be-
ing news. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 141-42, 220 n.5 (describing Justice Blackmun’s oral
argument questioning, notes, and visit to the symphony two nights before the oral argu-
ments in Zacchini).
60. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76; see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 464
(Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (interpreting Zacchini as concerned with the plaintiff ’s
“right to the publicity value of his performance”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Right of Pub-
licity in Digitally Produced Images: How the First Amendment Is Being Used to Pick Celebrities’
Pockets, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (“The right of performance is a corollary to the
right of publicity. This right was recognized by the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co. . . . .”).
61. See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 662-70 (1991); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right
of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 204-33 & n.205 (2012) (“[I]n the right of publicity context . . . a
person’s identity is not external in the same way that a completed creative work becomes ex-
ternal. The identity-holder remains tied to and integrated with the publicity rights in a
much more significant and ongoing way than an author remains tied to a copyrighted
work.”).
62. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573; see also id. at 576 (“Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right
of publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and
effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This same consider-
ation underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this Court.”).
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would occur in the absence of the legal right”63—applies with equal force in the
context of performances.64
Courts and commentators do not typically distinguish the protection of a
performance from the protection of a plaintiff ’s identity. Indeed, the standard
account of the right of publicity is that it focuses on “identity and ‘persona’” ra-
ther than on performances.65 Yet just as the point of copyright is to safeguard
the value of a work that is separate from the personality of the author of that
work, so the right of performance safeguards the value of a performance that is
separate from the identity of the performer who creates that work. The Su-
preme Court invoked this difference when it stressed that the news station had
63. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (2006) (describing the dominant justification for copy-
right).
64. See id. at 1187-88 (critiquing the analogy of the right of publicity to copyright law but noting
that in performance cases like Zacchini the analogy to copyright is “closest”); see also Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 126-27
(1996) (noting that protection in cases like Zacchini is “easy to understand” because
“[r]educing economic benefits” by failing to protect such performances would “dilute[] the
financial incentive to produce, with the arguable result that the public will, in the future,
have fewer performances to enjoy. In such instances the right of publicity serves as a useful
adjunct to the Copyright Clause”); K.J. Greene, Right of Publicity, Identity, and Performance,
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 865, 880-84 (2012) (noting “[g]aps in IP
[p]rotection for [p]erformances” and suggesting that “the Supreme Court was on to some-
thing” in Zacchini by protecting uncopyrighted performances). A number of scholars have
challenged copyright’s incentive rationale. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Cop-
yright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 321-22 (1970); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1717-18 (2006). Insofar as
these critiques are valid, they would seem to hold equal weight in the context of the right of
performance.
To the extent copyright is supported by rationales other than the creation of incentives, such
justifications would also apply to the right of performance. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018)
(granting artists moral rights to prevent “distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of
their work irrespective of physical ownership or copyright ownership); Shyamkrishna Bal-
ganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2020) (chronicling authorial rights-
based aspects of copyright law); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Proper-
ty, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1759-64 (2012) (observing that even under a purely incentive-based
approach to copyright law, rewarding authors in ways that further their personality-based
interests has an incentivizing effect); Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: Examining Moral
Rights in the United States, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 3-6 (Apr. 2019), https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VJ4-F5MR]
(noting the ways that the United States protects authors’ moral rights, including the right of
publicity).
65. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
§ 5.45 (2d ed. 2020).
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appropriated Zacchini’s “entire act.”66 Such a criterion would be meaningless if
applied to Zacchini’s likeness, name, or voice.
Once we focus on the protection of a performance, instead of on the protec-
tion of identity, it becomes clear that a plaintiff need not demonstrate the actual
or potential commercial success of her performance to bring a claim, nor must
she establish any preexisting value in her identity. YouTube sensations who
teach people how to do particular hairstyles or master a complex video game,
for example, should be entitled to bring right of performance claims for the
wrongful misappropriation of their performances, even if they have not other-
wise profited from their identity.67 Nor need plaintiffs show a commercial use
by defendants. Defendants can wrongfully appropriate performances by using
them in contexts not designed to produce a profit, as for example in fundrais-
ing for a nonprofit organization or during a political-campaign rally.68
The right of performance does not protect the ordinary experience of living
a life, even if that life happens to be captured on video or livestreamed, and
even if in some sense we are all “performing” in public.69 To claim protection
under a right of performance, a plaintiff must intentionally have created a per-
66. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 564, 569-70, 574-75 (emphasis added) (highlighting that the unauthor-
ized use of Zacchini’s performance was of his “entire act,” a term used seven times in the
opinion); see also id. at 579-80 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “entire act” standard
and “doubt[ing] that this formula provides a standard clear enough even for resolution of
this case”). There was a dispute about whether Zacchini’s “entire act” was actually broadcast.
As Justice Powell noted in his dissent,
[a]lthough the record is not explicit, it is unlikely that the “act” commenced
abruptly with the explosion that launched petitioner on his way, ending with the
landing in the net a few seconds later. One may assume that the actual firing was
preceded by some fanfare, possibly stretching over several minutes, to heighten
the audience’s anticipation: introduction of the performer, description of the
uniqueness and danger, last-minute checking of the apparatus, and entry into the
cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous commentary from the master of
ceremonies.
Id. at 579 n.1.
67. We note that in these contexts YouTube performances are also likely protected by copyright.
68. Although we do not intend in this Article to argue for or against postmortem rights, we
acknowledge that to the extent the justifications supporting the right of performance are
analogous to those that support copyright laws, it may make sense to extend a limited post-
mortem period for performances, just as copyrights survive an author’s death. A postmor-
tem right of performance, however, need not (and likely should not) track the copyright
term, which many have criticized as far too lengthy. Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 213-22 (2003) (sug-
gesting that copyright terms of longer than twenty-five years are not well justified but not-
ing that indefinite renewals of commercially successful works might make sense).
69. To the extent that livestreaming is captured in a fixed form, copyright protection may apply
to that fixation.
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formance. There will undoubtedly be ambiguous circumstances, especially in a
world of “reality” television and unscripted programming. States will have to
determine the legal boundaries between life and performance. But the bar for
having a protectable right of performance should be higher than the mere re-
cording or dissemination of one’s life. A plaintiff must take affirmative steps to
enact the discrete kind of behavior that would justify legal protection as an in-
dependent “performance” that exists apart from a plaintiff ’s ordinary lived
identity.
The right of performance protects not only against the unauthorized fixa-
tion and distribution of a plaintiff ’s performance, as occurred in Zacchini, but
also against the unauthorized creation of new performances using previously
captured footage of a plaintiff ’s performance. The case of No Doubt v. Activision
Publishing, Inc. offers an example.70 In No Doubt, a video game company violat-
ed the plaintiff band members’ rights of performance by creating and employ-
ing digital avatars of the punk rock group in its game Band Hero. Even though
the band, including its lead singer Gwen Stefani, had authorized Activision to
scan their performances digitally and to use motion-capture data to populate
the game with the digital avatars, Activision’s uses exceeded the terms of the
contract between the parties. The distribution of these recreated performances
was therefore without authorization and violated the band members’ rights of
performance.71
If Activision had instead used different performers to create “new” No
Doubt performances, or created these performances without using previously
captured data, the appropriate action would not be for the right of perfor-
mance, but instead a claim for the right of commercial value. Although the newly
fashioned digital performances would exploit the market value of plaintiffs’
identities, they would not violate their right of performance. This distinction is
important because, as we shall see in Part III, First Amendment doctrine re-
stricts the right of commercial value quite differently than it restricts claims as-
serting a right of performance.72
The right of performance must be carefully limited so as not to restrict the
creation of new performances. The right of performance should impose liabil-
ity only when a performance is truly derived—digitally or otherwise—from a
plaintiff ’s actual performance. Using Tom Cruise’s original performance to dig-
itally recreate or edit a new performance by “Tom Cruise” in a sequel to Top
70. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Ct. App. 2011).
71. See id. at 405-12. The California appellate court’s analysis in the case focused broadly on the
misappropriation of the identities of the band members, but the circumstances also impli-
cate the entirely distinct interest that we identify as the right of performance.
72. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
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Gun (without his participation) could violate Cruise’s right of performance,
but hiring a new actor to imitate Tom Cruise would not.73
Understood in this way, the right of performance should protect against
digital reanimation when done by using previously captured performances,
which is becoming increasingly common as avatars of living and dead actors
are now presented as performing in motion pictures,74 and holograms of de-
73. This example is based on a question posed by Judge Bybee of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals during the oral argument in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). Judge Bybee asked whether movie studios would be
free to recreate actors’ performances digitally based on their original performances, such as
that of Tom Cruise in Top Gun, if the Ninth Circuit were to hold that the First Amendment
insulated a video game maker from liability for using avatars of student athletes in its
games. Oral Argument at 9:26, in In re NCAA, 724 F.3d 1268 (No. 10-15387),
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000006196 [https://
perma.cc/2RX9-6MAM]. Were a studio to recreate Cruise’s performance in a Top Gun se-
quel by digitally altering his performance from the original film, Cruise could potentially
bring claims for both a right of performance and a right of commercial value. As we discuss
infra in Sections I.B and III.B.2, however, the right of commercial value claim would likely
fail unless there was confusion about whether Cruise was actually performing in the role or
about whether he had sponsored or endorsed the recreated performance. The reuse of the
copyrighted footage by the studio might also raise copyright preemption issues. See infra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Ashley Cullins, Carrie Fisher, “Star Wars” and the Legal Issues of Dead but In-Demand
Actors, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 1, 2017, 6:45 AM PDT), https://www.hollywoodreporter
.com/news/carrie-fisher-star-wars-legal-issues-dead-but-demand-actors-997335 [https://
perma.cc/M26R-GNTY]; Carolyn Giardina, How “Furious 7” Brought the Late Paul Walker
Back to Life, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 11, 2015, 5:00 AM PST), https://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/behind-screen/how-furious-7-brought-late-845763 [https://
perma.cc/6TPG-YEKQ]; Benjamin Lee, Discretion, Not CGI: How Philip Seymour Hoffman
Was Kept in the Hunger Games, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2015, 7:35 AM EST), https://www
.theguardian.com/film/2015/nov/17/philip-seymour-hoffman-hunger-games-mockingjay-
2-paul-walker [https://perma.cc/3G4P-P8HC]; Alex Lee, The Messy Legal Scrap to Bring Ce-
lebrities Back from the Dead, WIRED (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/james-
dean-dead-actors-rights [https://perma.cc/CKZ2-U7B7] (discussing plans to produce a
film starring a reanimated James Dean).
We note that these issues were present even before modern computer-generated imagery
technology. See Eriq Gardner, “Back to the Future II” from a Legal Perspective: Unintentionally
Visionary, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 21, 2015, 3:51 PM PDT), https://www.hollywoodreporter
.com/thr-esq/back-future-ii-a-legal-833705 [https://perma.cc/5VSS-Y39P].
It is not surprising that the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Ra-
dio Artists (SAG-AFTRA), the main actors’ union, has expressed concern over such possible
reanimation of performances. See Who Owns You: SAG-AFTRA Steps Up the Fight to Ensure
Members Have Control of Their Own Likenesses, SAG-AFTRA MAG., Summer 2018, at 30, 31
http://digital.copcomm.com/i/1012073-summer-2018/37?m4 [https://perma.cc/KZP3-
EHUV]; see also Brief for Screen Actors Guild, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lee at 2, in In re NCAA, 724 F.3d 1268 (No. 10-15387) (considering the allowance of digital
avatars in video games potentially “ruinous to a performers’ career and financial interests”);
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ceased performers are going on tour.75 If these recreated performances are pro-
duced without using captured footage of previous performances, however,
plaintiffs should be barred from bringing right of performance claims, even
though they may well be able to bring right of commercial value claims.
Insofar as a performance is captured in a fixed form, the question arises
whether state protections for a right of performance are preempted by the
Copyright Act.76 This is the one context in which courts have distinguished be-
tween the invocation of state law to protect an “image or likeness” and its use
to protect a “copyrightable dramatic or musical performance.”77 To the extent
that any claimed right of performance extends no further than the very “per-
formance” that constitutes “copyrighted material,” such a claim by a performer
is likely to be preempted, at least with respect to a performance that has been
Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for New York?, 36 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 575-76, 598 (2018) (discussing SAG-AFTRA’s role in expanding and
advocating for broader rights of publicity).
75. See, e.g., Andrew Dalton, In the Spirit of Whitney: Houston Hologram Tour Set to Begin, SEAT-
TLE TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020, 12:20 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/in-the-
spirit-of-whitney-houston-hologram-tour-set-to-begin [https://perma.cc/S2A5-U7KF];
Eriq Gardner, Hollywood Hologram Wars: Vicious Legal Feud Behind Virtual Mariah, Marilyn
and Mick, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 28, 2015, 9:00 AM PDT), https://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/hollywood-hologram-wars-vicious-legal-798401 [https://
perma.cc/ER4E-LU9B]; Stephen Humphries, Buddy Holly’s Back . . . as a Touring Hologram.
But Is It ‘Live’ Music?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.csmonitor
.com/The-Culture/Music/2019/1204/Buddy-Holly-s-back-as-a-touring-hologram.-But-is-
it-live-music [https://perma.cc/9NL9-YSVE]; Gregory Zinman, Going ‘Full Tupac’, ATLAN-
TIC (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/08/help-us-
tupac-youre-our-only-hope/497435 [https://perma.cc/RZV2-HG9W].
76. The lack of clarity about what is meant by the Copyright Act’s explicit preemption provi-
sion, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018), has led to conflicts in evaluating copyright-preemption defens-
es, particularly in the context of right of publicity cases. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 160-
64, 168-75; Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 199, 208, 225-36 (2002) [hereinafter Rothman, Copyright Preemption] (advocating
for a Supremacy Clause-based implied preemption analysis to address the confusion); Jen-
nifer E. Rothman, The Other Side of Garcia: The Right of Publicity and Copyright Preemption,
39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 441, 445-47 (2016).
77. Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added); see also
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003-05 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that feder-
al copyright preemption did not apply to a right of publicity claim arising out of the use of a
photograph); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (contrasting plaintiff ’s claim “based on her voice alone” with her preempted claim
based “on the sampling of her performance”).
Seen through the lens of copyright, it is clear that a “person’s likeness—her persona—is not
authored and it is not fixed.” Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005).
It is also clear that a “voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’” Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1984)); see
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 163-64. Fixed performances, by contrast, are copyrightable.
the yale law journal 130:86 2020
106
lawfully captured and then is used or licensed by the copyright holder.78 But if
a performance is fixed without permission (as it was in Zacchini), the copyright
preemption defense should fail when asserted by the maker of the recording.79
78. See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Balt. Ori-
oles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 677 n.26 (7th Cir. 1986)
(distinguishing “performance” cases in which the “performance . . . has been reduced to
tangible form” from those involving a “public figure’s persona” for purposes of preemption
analysis). One “who does not hold the copyright in a performance captured on film cannot
prevent the one who does from exploiting it by resort to state law.” Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
652-53. In a recent decision, the Second Circuit held that a right of publicity action that in
effect asserted only a right of performance was subject to implied preemption under the
Copyright Act. The court suggested that right of publicity actions which asserted other in-
terests, like those protected by the right of commercial value or the right of dignity, might,
in contrast, not be preempted. See Jackson v. Roberts (In re Jackson), No. 19-480, 2020 WL
4810706 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2020).
We note that the issue of copyright preemption usually arises when plaintiffs try to enforce
their rights of performance against a lawful copyright holder or licensee. But some cases
have also considered the question in a different context, one in which the plaintiff holds
both the copyright in the performance and the relevant right of performance. Such a situa-
tion arose in the Ninth Circuit case Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d
1146 (9th Cir. 2010). The plaintiffs were an adult entertainer and the company he owned
which held the copyrights to the entertainer’s performances. Id. at 1149. His company sued
for both copyright infringement and a violation of his right of publicity when the defendant
copied and distributed the entertainer’s videos. Id. at 1149-50. Although the Ninth Circuit
held that the right of publicity claim was preempted by the Copyright Act, id. at 1152-55, we
see no reason why the performance claim should be preempted when it is not in conflict
with the Copyright Act and works toward protecting related or harmonious interests, as in
Jules Jordan Video. See Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 76, at 241-43; see also
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836-37 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that
plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants used “their names, likenesses and identities on radio,
television and the Internet” to advertise the release of a tape were “unrelated to the elements
of copyright infringement” in plaintiffs’ allegations).
79. Copyright law requires any fixation to be “by or under the authority of the author” before
copyright attaches. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B][3] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2020) (expressing skepti-
cism that performances “per se” are works “subject to copyright protection”).
Difficult questions can arise if a copyright holder exercises its right under copyright law to
prepare a derivative work by using copyrighted digital material to create a new performance,
and the recreated performance then exceeds the uses agreed to by the person whose initial
performance was captured with consent. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 170-78 (diag-
nosing the differential treatment of copyright preemption in the context of derivative
works). The Tom Cruise hypothetical in which his copyrighted performance is reused in a
sequel, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, would raise such an issue because the movie
studio likely holds the copyright to the original material. Cf. Lewis v. Activision Blizzard,
Inc., No. C 12-1096 CW, 2012 WL 5199505, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012), aff ’d, 634 F.
App’x 182 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissing a publicity claim on the basis of preemption when an
employee’s voice performance was reused in a video game without additional compensation
or permission); Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding
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B. The Right of Commercial Value
A second interest frequently asserted in the context of right of publicity
claims is that of protecting the market value of a person’s identity. We postulate
the right of commercial value as an ideal tort oriented toward this interest. In
contrast to the right of performance, the right of commercial value is designed
to protect the market value of a person’s identity separate and apart from any
particular performance produced by that person.80
The protection of the commercial value of a person’s identity is what some
commentators regard as the essential purpose of the right of publicity.81 The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines the right of publicity as pre-
venting the appropriation of the “commercial value of a person’s identity,” and it
describes the right as “secur[ing] for plaintiffs the commercial value of their
fame.”82 Many scholars have highlighted this commercial aspect of the right of
that martial artists’ right of publicity claims are preempted when their performances were
reused in new video games).
In addition to preempting some right of performance claims brought against the copyright
holders and licensees of consensually recorded performances, copyright might also preempt
claims that obstruct copyright’s “negative spaces—the places copyright law expressly leaves
free from ownership or enforcement.” ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 177; see also id. at 178 (fur-
ther elaborating on these “negative spaces”).
80. Although the term “commercial” means many different things across state publicity laws, see
Rothman, supra note 31, at 1950-55, 1959-65, we use the term here to indicate the monetary
value that the use of a person’s identity can command in the marketplace.
81. Such commercial value claims were present from the inception of the appropriation tort.
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 30-35 & nn.1, 8-10 (using archival research to document that
“[w]hen the right of privacy was adopted, it protected both private and public figures alike,
including those with commercially valuable identities who actively sought out publicity and
promoted themselves”); see, e.g., Complaint, Case on Appeal at 5-9, Loftus v. Greenwich
Lithographing, 182 N.Y.S. 428 (1920); Complaint, Case on Appeal at 4-9, Redmond v. Co-
lumbia Pictures, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 643 (App. Div. 1938) (No.859).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (empha-
sis added). Although the Restatement (Third) observes that the right of publicity encom-
passes both personality-based and market-based interests, it concludes that the right has an
“emphasis on commercial interests.” Id. Some states require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a
defendant’s unauthorized use be for a “commercial or advertising purpose,” FLA. STAT.
§ 540.08 (2019), for “commercial advantage,” Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369
(Mo. 2003), “for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade,” N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2019), or in “products, merchandise, or goods, or for the purpose of
advertising or selling, or soliciting,” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2020). Notably, sec-
tion 652C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not limit appropriation claims to those
involving the appropriation of a person’s commercial value. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Many state laws also do not require such a
showing. See, e.g., Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Ct. App. 2010)
(noting that California’s common-law right of publicity tort allows liability when the use is
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publicity. Richard Posner and William Landes describe the right of publicity as
a right “valuable mainly to celebrities” and focus solely on market-based justifi-
cations for the tort’s existence.83 J.T. McCarthy, the author of the authoritative
treatise on the right of publicity, has defined the right as an “intellectual prop-
erty right whose infringement is a commercial tort of unfair competition” that
provides a right to “control the commercial use of identity . . . and recover in
court damages and the commercial value of an unpermitted taking.”84
Right of commercial value claims are often brought by celebrities because
the misappropriation of their identities is more likely to produce measurable
market harms. Well-known individuals can suffer injuries that range from lost
job opportunities and endorsement deals to reduced salaries, loss of revenue
from licensing and merchandising contracts, and overall diminishment of
goodwill (understood as the public’s positive associations with that individu-
al).85 As we shall see, however, ordinary persons who are entirely unknown to
the general public can sometimes also bring right of commercial value claims.
While the right of performance is intended to encourage the creation of per-
formances, incentivizing persons to invest their identity with commercial value is
a fundamentally different and less attractive justification for a tort. Performanc-
es possess intrinsic value; they add to our culture. They are potentially edifying
events in the world that might not exist without the protections of copyright
and the right of performance. In contrast, a commercially valuable identity is
not a distinct event. It is a form of life, most commonly designated by the idea
of celebrity. There is no convincing reason for the law to attribute intrinsic val-
ue to the creation of celebrity personalities.86 Society has no reason to treasure
people being famous for the sake of being famous. And even if society were de-
“to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise” (quoting Eastwood v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App. 1983))); see also Rothman, supra note 31, at 1950-55,
1959-64 (discussing the differing treatment of commerciality in state right of publicity
laws).
83. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 68, at 64, 222-28; see Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A
Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634 (2003).
84. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2018 ed.) (emphasis
added). Roger Schechter recently joined McCarthy as an author of the treatise, but this
phrase from the treatise long predates the 2019 edition that Schechter joined.
85. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 68, at 222-28; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 110-11; Mark F.
Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 103-04
(1994).
86. In fact, incentivizing fame might skew behavior toward notoriety and away from more
meaningful contributions to society. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 215-19 (1993).
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termined to encourage such stardom, it is doubtful that a right of commercial
value would significantly incentivize people to become celebrities.87
It has sometimes been said, therefore, that the right of commercial value
rests instead on the jurisprudential premise that persons simply own the com-
mercial value of their identity. The Missouri Court of Appeals, for example, ob-
served in 1911:
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if it is to be made a matter
of merchandise, why should it not be for his benefit? It is a right which
he may wish to exercise for his own profit, and why may he not restrain
another who is using it for gain? If there is value in it, sufficient to ex-
cite the cupidity of another, why is it not the property of him who gives
it the value and from whom the value springs?88
This justification, which sounds in intellectual property, is extraordinarily
far-reaching. It is quite common for persons to profit commercially from the
identity of celebrities. Authors of biographies, gossip magazines, movie data-
bases, and even some creators of fan pages on social media, all derive profit
from the identity of celebrities. It would be overreaching to interpret a property
right so broadly as to prevent these ordinary and legitimate uses of celebrity
identities.
87. As Judge Tacha once wrote for the Tenth Circuit,
[t]he [Supreme] Court’s incentive rationale is obviously more compelling in a
right of performance case than in a more typical right of publicity case involving
the appropriation of a celebrity’s identity. . . .
. . . [T]he additional inducement for achievement produced by publicity
rights are often inconsequential because most celebrities with valuable commer-
cial identities are already handsomely compensated.
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973-74 (10th Cir.
1996); see also C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1098 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff ’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting
its skepticism of the incentive-rationale justification for publicity rights in instances that do
not involve “actual performances”); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 68, at 223 (describing any
incentive effect as likely “minimal” or “incremental”). As Richard Posner has observed,
[a] person is unlikely to invest less than he would otherwise do in becoming a
movie star or other type of celebrity merely because he’ll be unable to appropriate
the entire income from the franchising of his name and likeness; there is free rid-
ing but not the type that threatens to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.
Posner, supra note 83, at 634. For further discussion and challenges to the incentive-rationale
rubric for right of publicity laws, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 99-102; Madow, supra note
86, at 215-19; and Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity’s Intellectual Property Turn, 42
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 313 (2019) (questioning the applicability of the incentive rationale
outside of performance-based cases like Zacchini).
88. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).
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In practice, courts recognize the right of commercial value in far more dis-
crete and nuanced ways than simply by postulating an abstract property right
in identity. We discern three distinct contexts in which courts are likely to pro-
tect a right of commercial value. Each ultimately depends upon an account of
what it means to act fairly in the commercial marketplace.89
1. Confusion
The first concerns uses of a plaintiff ’s identity that create confusion about
the plaintiff ’s participation or sponsorship. An example of such a claim is Ab-
dul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.,90 in which the famous basketball star
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar brought a right of publicity claim against General Mo-
tors for using his name in an advertisement for Oldsmobile cars. Abdul-
Jabbar’s primary complaint was that viewers of the commercial would think
that he had agreed to have his name used in the advertisement and endorsed
Oldsmobile cars. It is easy to see how such confusion might damage the poten-
tial commercial value of a plaintiff ’s identity and interfere with a plaintiff ’s
own endorsement or career opportunities.
One need not be a celebrity like Abdul-Jabbar to have such confusing uses
interfere with one’s commercial pursuits. For example, Christine Dancel and
others brought a recent class-action lawsuit against Groupon for scraping their
Instagram accounts and using their likenesses and names without permis-
sion.91 The complaint alleges that Groupon did this to “intentionally create[]
the false impression that the consumers appearing in the photos are endorsing,
or have at least purchased, the [Groupon] Deal itself.”92 The complaint con-
tended that Groupon did this intentionally to profit from the specific Insta-
gram users’ “social influence.”93 In effect, the allegation was that Groupon was
89. Cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1190-1208 (suggesting that trademark law provides a
useful analogy for understanding—and limiting—the right of publicity, and analyzing the
right of publicity using the trademark frameworks of confusion, dilution, cybersquatting,
and merchandising).
90. 85 F.3d 407, 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that although General Motors Corpora-
tion used Abdul-Jabbar’s previous name, Lew Alcindor, consumers would recognize that
name as pointing to Abdul-Jabbar).
91. Dancel v. Groupon, Inc., 940 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2019). The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed
the district court’s order denying class certification to Dancel and others. Dancel v. Groupon,
Inc., 949 F.3d 999, 1010 (7th Cir. 2019).
92. Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 7, Dancel v. Groupon, Inc., No.
2016CH01716 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Dancel Complaint].
93. Id. at 6; see id. at 6-7.
the first amendment and the right(s) of publicity
111
interfering with the opportunities of Dancel or other members of the class to
monetize their status as potential social media influencers.
The aspect of the right of commercial value that is based on confusion is
analogous to trademark infringement and false endorsement laws that protect
against confusion as to the source or sponsorship of products and services.94
The right of commercial value fills potential gaps in these laws. Most ordinary
people will not be able to establish trademark rights in their names and like-
nesses, and they may be disqualified from bringing false endorsement claims
because they lack established commercial identities. Even some public figures
who have not commercialized their identities may struggle to establish suffi-
cient commercial interests to meet the standing requirements of a false en-
dorsement claim.95
2. Diminishment
A second basis for liability is the improper use of a plaintiff ’s identity that
threatens to dilute or lessen its existing market value. We use the label dimin-
ishment to signify this variation of the right of commercial value. An example of
such a claim can be seen in late-night talk show host Johnny Carson’s lawsuit
against “Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets,” a portable toilet company that used
the cheeky slogan “The World’s Foremost Commodian.”96 The Sixth Circuit
94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2018); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 442 (6th
Cir. 2003) (allowing a false advertising claim to proceed against a record label for the use of
Rosa Parks’s name as a song title); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 632-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding a Lanham Act violation and granting injunctive relief in the con-
text of an advertisement that used a Woody Allen look-alike).
95. False endorsement claims brought under the Federal Lanham Act do not require the estab-
lishment of trademark rights, but they do require a demonstration of an economic interest
sufficient to establish standing under the statute. See, e.g., Parks, 329 F.3d at 446-47 (con-
cluding that Rosa Parks could bring a Lanham Act claim because she had established a
“property interest in her name” as a result of her commercial activities and particularly be-
cause of her involvement in a tribute album); Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881
(E.D. Wis. 2009) (rejecting a false endorsement claim on the basis of lack of standing be-
cause the plaintiff—an allegedly well-known animal rights advocate and business person—
had “not engaged in the commercial marketing of her identity,” and did “not allege an intent
to commercialize” her identity); cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118, 131-32 (2014) (holding that to bring a suit for false advertising under the Lan-
ham Act, a plaintiff must establish “a commercial interest in reputation or sales”). But see
Hauf v. Life Extension Found., 547 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776-77 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding
that one need not be a “celebrity” to bring a false endorsement claim, and allowing a cancer
patient’s false endorsement claim to proceed if his identity was “distinctiv[e]” and he had a
“degree of recognition” or “notoriety among cancer patients or advocates of alternative med-
icine that is strong enough to have commercial value within the identifiable group”).
96. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983).
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held that even though consumers were not likely to be confused as to Carson’s
sponsorship of the business, Carson’s “protected pecuniary interest in the
commercial exploitation of his identity” was nevertheless violated.97 The court
was concerned that the defendant’s offending use could potentially tarnish the
value of Carson’s brand by associating him with porta potties, and that the pro-
liferation of unauthorized uses might diminish the value of Carson’s brand
when it came to obtaining compensation for sanctioned endorsements.98
Diminishment serves an analogous function to trademark dilution law. As
the Supreme Court has observed, liability for dilution does not turn on likely
confusion.99 Instead, dilution laws seek to “preserv[e] . . . the uniqueness of a
trademark.”100 They are “intended ‘to protect famous trademarks from subse-
quent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage
it.’”101 We recognize that some scholars have expressed concern about both the
legitimacy of dilution law’s goals and its effectiveness at achieving those
goals.102 Our point, however, is that the same impulses that have led courts and
legislatures to recognize dilution claims in the context of trademark law operate
with equal force in the context of the right of publicity.103
97. Id. at 835.
98. Id.
99. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003), superseded in part by statute,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (replacing the
Court’s “actual dilution” requirement with a “likely dilution” requirement).
100. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831
(1927).
101. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. 38,559-61 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2018) (providing statutory definitions of “blurring”
and “tarnishment”); Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 205-07
(2d Cir. 2013) (providing an overview of federal trademark dilution law leading up to the
passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act).
102. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the
First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 449, 449 (2007); Barton Beebe, Roy Germano, Christopher Jon Sprigman & Joel
H. Steckel, Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and the Lab, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 612
(2019); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1029, 1029 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 507 (2008).
103. Cf. Barton Beebe, What Trademark Law Is Learning from the Right of Publicity, 42 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 389, 394-95 (2019) (drawing parallels between antidilution and anti-tarnishment
protections and the right of publicity). But see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1198-1200
(questioning whether blurring and tarnishment of “personal names” is likely “to be a com-
mon occurrence”). To the extent that empirical challenges to trademark dilution are merited,
they likely have equal force in the context of diminishment-based right of publicity claims.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Diminishment claims also serve a gap-filling function. They can be pressed
without requiring a plaintiff to possess her own established trademark and
without requiring that the defendant’s use be as a designation for products or
services, as is now required under federal trademark dilution law.104 In the con-
text of the right of commercial value, diminishment can occur in two ways that
are analogous to trademark dilution law. The first is by “overexpos[ing]” a ce-
lebrity in a way that likely diminishes the market value of her identity, and the
second is by negatively depicting a celebrity in a way that tarnishes her identity
and thereby diminishes its commercial value.105
We must be careful in our formulation of diminishment actions, however,
because many perfectly ordinary uses of a famous plaintiff ’s identity will dilute
or lessen its market value. Every tabloid exposé threatens to diminish the
commercial value of a celebrity’s identity, as does every negative review. We
think it plain that the right of commercial value does not and should not reach
harms of this kind. It makes the most sense to confine diminishment claims to
those that occur in a purely commercial context involving the sale, marketing,
or advertising of nonexpressive products or services.
This is exactly what Congress has done in trademark dilution law. Federal
dilution claims cannot be brought for “noncommercial uses” of a mark, which
is commonly interpreted as limiting dilution claims to those that occur in
commercial speech.106 Diminishment is accordingly best understood as re-
dressing commercial harms caused by unfair competition, rather than as en-
dowing persons with an unqualified property right in their identity.
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2018). We note that prior to the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 it was not clear that federal dilution claims required use by the defendant as a mark.
Several state laws have recognized dilution claims even when the use is not as a mark. See,
e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1994); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky
Way Prods., Inc., No. C78-679A, 1981 WL 1402, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981); Coca-Cola
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
105. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 68, at 223-27. Some have challenged the likelihood that
such overexposure or tarnishment will actually occur and damage a celebrity’s market value.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 142-48 & nn.67-71 (2004) (questioning the “overuse” justifications, among
others, for the right of publicity).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2018); Radiance Found. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2015);
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); H.R. REP. NO. 104-
374, at 8 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035 (indicating that the dilution
provision only applies to “commercial speech” and that it is not intended to limit “consumer
product reviews,” news, movies, or television); 141 CONG. REC. H14,317-18 (daily ed. Dec.
12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). But see Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussy-
cat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying dilution law to noncom-
mercial speech); Pillsbury Co., 1981 WL 1402, at *14 (same); Coca-Cola Co., 346 F. Supp. at
1188, 1193 (same). For a more detailed discussion of this conflict, see Rothman, supra note
31, at 1942-44.
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In contrast to confusion, which can injure the commercial value of a person’s
identity whether or not they are famous, the harm of diminishment applies pri-
marily (perhaps exclusively) to those plaintiffs whose identities already possess
goodwill in the market. The commercial value of such identities may be dis-
tinctly vulnerable to damage through overexposure and tarnishment. We ac-
cordingly hypothesize that a plaintiff must establish that her identity is widely
recognized and invested with significant market value before being authorized
to bring a claim for diminishment. This would be analogous to dilution law’s
requirement that a mark be “famous” before a plaintiff can bring a claim.107 To
prove a diminishment claim, plaintiffs would also need to show that the de-
fendant’s use of their identity is likely to (or actually did) cause diminishment
to that value.108
3. Unjust Enrichment
In addition to confusion and diminishment, right of commercial value
claims also invoke a third theory of liability. Courts frequently say that a de-
fendant was unjustly enriched by “unfairly” appropriating the economic value
of a plaintiff ’s identity.109 They mean by this that a defendant has commercially
employed a plaintiff ’s identity without having paid the market rate to do so.
We call this prong of the right of commercial value unjust enrichment.
This branch of the right of commercial value requires neither a showing of
confusion nor diminishment. A defendant who without consent or compensa-
tion uses the identity of another in the context of advertising or marketing
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2018); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1199.
108. We note that the federal dilution provision of the Lanham Act initially was held to require a
plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant’s use actually diluted the plaintiff ’s mark, but the
statute has now been amended to allow for liability on the basis of a lesser showing that the
use is “likely to cause dilution.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2018) (emphasis added); Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), superseded in part by statute, Trademark Dilu-
tion Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730. We think that the standards
of either likely or actual diminishment are equally likely to pass constitutional muster in the
context of commercial speech. See infra Section III.B.2. We take no position on which stand-
ard states should adopt as a matter of substantive law.
109. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The ‘right of publicity’ ‘signif[ies] the
right of an individual, especially a public figure or a celebrity, to control the commercial val-
ue and exploitation of his name and picture or likeness and to prevent others from unfairly
appropriating this value for commercial benefit.’” (quoting Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981))); see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[T]he interest which underlies protecting the right of publicity ‘is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.’” (quoting
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966))).
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goods and services effectively appropriates whatever economic value he would
otherwise have had to pay for the use of that identity. The defendant accord-
ingly owes the plaintiff a remedy sounding in restitution.110 Unjust enrichment
does not apply outside of commercial contexts because we do not generally re-
gard it as “unfair” for persons to refer to matters of common knowledge, which
includes the identity of persons.
Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.111 is a good example of an action for unjust enrich-
ment. The plaintiffs in Fraley were all ordinary folk without otherwise com-
mercially valuable identities. Facebook facilitated the use of plaintiffs’ identities
to advertise products without their consent. The plaintiffs successfully alleged
“that their individual, personalized endorsement of products, services, and
brands to their friends and acquaintances has concrete, provable value in the
economy at large, which can be measured by the additional profit Facebook
earns from selling Sponsored Stories compared to its sale of regular advertise-
ments.”112 The plaintiffs claimed that Facebook had unfairly appropriated that
value.
Unjust enrichment claims provide a remedy to ordinary people whose iden-
tities have been unfairly appropriated in the marketplace. Just as diminishment
claims prevent commercial advertisers from unfairly appropriating the identi-
ties of those whose names and images possess market value, so unjust enrich-
ment claims offer legal redress to persons who are otherwise unknown but
whose identities have been unfairly appropriated by commercial advertisers. In
today’s social media age, “anonymous” individuals can sometimes have great
value to advertisers when used to appeal to an online circle of “friends.”113
110. See, e.g., Dancel v. Groupon, Inc., 940 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2019); In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hilton v. Hallmark Cards,
599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitu-
tion, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 467 (1992) (suggesting that restitution
is an appropriate remedy for unauthorized uses of a person’s identity). Some of the most
controversial right of publicity cases have rested solely on unjust enrichment. See ROTHMAN,
supra note 1, at 156-57; Stacey L. Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: Pub-
licity as a Legal Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS
OF IP 17, 17-18 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014) (observing that
right of publicity claims went off the rails when courts “abandoned a harms-based approach
to celebrity publicity rights in favor of an approach centered on unjust enrichment”).
111. 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
112. Id. at 799.
113. See id.; Hauf v. Life Extension Found., 547 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776-77 (W.D. Mich. 2008); Dan-
cel Complaint, supra note 92, at 6-7; see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER:
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 48, 71 (2019) (observing that
“[t]he data flows extracted from people play an increasingly important role as raw material
in the political economy of informational capitalism” and these “data flows extracted from
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The right of commercial value has caused endless confusion because it is so
easily conflated with a generalized property right in the commercial value of
identity. But any such account of the right would immediately produce intoler-
able results, sweeping into its ambit uncontroversially legitimate uses of others’
identities. We therefore propose to facilitate more precise jurisprudential and
constitutional analysis by conceiving the tort as instead addressed to market-
based damages caused by the three specific variants we identify—confusion, di-
minishment, and unjust enrichment.
C. The Right of Control
We have resisted grounding the right of commercial value on a general prop-
erty right to one’s identity because it would be incompatible with the ways that
information is actually used in our society. The right of commercial value is too
prevalent in litigation and legislation to risk such obvious conceptual chaos. A
fair reading of the law, however, suggests that there are nevertheless variants of
the right of publicity that do in fact ultimately seek to invest persons with a
general right to control how others use their identities. We therefore isolate
this interest in an ideal tort, which we call the right of control.
The right of control is frequently expressed through the metaphor of prop-
erty. Persons are said to own their own identity and accordingly are authorized
to control its use by others. If we press exactly why persons should be endowed
with this property right, the answer, most especially in modern times, is that
persons should be able to control their identity to the extent necessary for the
full development of their own personhood. We therefore theorize the right of
control as oriented toward the protection of the autonomy of personality rather
than market damages.
One can discern assertions of the right of control in the origins of privacy
and publicity law in the United States. Starting in the late 1800s, the develop-
ment of easy-to-use portable cameras made it possible to capture the images of
persons as they appeared in public. Technological improvements enabled these
images to be used in advertisements, on products, and in magazines and news-
papers. These changes inspired calls for a right of control that would empower
persons to govern the use of their images by others.114
In 1894, for example, a district court in Massachusetts concluded that a pri-
vate individual has “the right to control the reproduction of his picture or photo-
people―and, by extension, people themselves” are being commodified and monetized to
produce wealth for third parties, including for various social media platforms).
114. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 11-29; The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8.
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graph.”115 A bill was introduced into the New York legislature in 1897 making
it a crime to “print, publish, or circulate in any newspaper, paper, periodical,
magazine, pamphlet, or book any portrait or alleged portrait of any person or
individual living in this State . . . without having first obtained his or her writ-
ten consent.”116 Two years later, California passed such a portraiture ban.117 Ar-
ticles and essays of this era sometimes justified the right by theorizing that per-
sons possessed a “natural copyright” in their own features.118
Concern over the reproduction of photographic imagery in part reflected
contemporary sentiments that it was a “humiliation and mortification” to have
“one’s picture . . . used by another,” “reproduced and exhibited anywhere.”119
That these uses of photographs were experienced as “offensive[]” is a sign that
they were also understood as disrespectful and inconsistent with individual
115. Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 281 (D. Mass. 1894) (emphasis added). Although the
court recognized such a right, at least as to private individuals, it rejected the plaintiff ’s claim
because he was a deceased public figure with respect to whom the use of a photograph in a
“biographical sketch” was permissible. Id. at 283.
116. New York Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1897, at 4; see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 16-
20 (documenting the widespread “[c]alls for [r]edress” in light of the “technological and
cultural developments” of the late nineteenth century).
117. Act of Feb. 23, 1899, ch. 29, 1899 Cal. Stat. 28 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 258 (Deering
1915)) (repealed 1991); see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 19, 191 n.17.
118. J.A.J., The Legal Relations of Photographs, 17 AM. L. REG. 1, 8 (1869); see also Portrait Right, 12
WASH. L. REP. 353, 353 (1884) (considering possible solutions to unauthorized uses of a per-
son’s photograph, including use of analogies to “literary property”); The Right to Privacy, 6
GREEN BAG 498, 499 (1894) (considering whether there is “a right of property in one’s per-
sonal appearance that entitles the person to prevent the publication of a photograph”); cf.
Current Topics, 24 SOLIC. J. 1, 1-2 (1879) (suggesting that as a matter of copyright law the sit-
ter (or other patron) should own the photograph if it was “made or executed for or on be-
half” of them for “good and valuable consideration”). In such contexts, the analogy to copy-
right cannot be to a property right designed to create incentives to produce independent
works or to reward an author’s efforts, as the Court theorized in Zacchini, because persons
do not produce their distinctive “features” in response to incentives or through labor. In-
stead, a person’s features evolve naturally as an inescapable dimension of their identity. The
analogy to copyright thus is likely based on what Margaret Jane Radin once described as
“property for personhood.” Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 961 (1982). For a discussion of personality-based theories of copyright law, see Bal-
ganesh, supra note 64 passim, and Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEO. L.J. 287, 330-65 (1988). See also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION
OF COPYRIGHT (1993) (documenting the longstanding role of author- and “personality”-
based justifications for copyright law); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in 1 A
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 653, 660 (Robert Goodin, Philip
Pettit & Thomas Pogge eds., 2d ed. 2007) (describing personality-based theories of intellec-
tual property).
119. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
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dignity.120 We shall discuss this discrete interest in the next Section, in which
we examine the right of dignity. For the moment, however, we stress that initial
concerns over photographic imagery also contained an analytically distinct
strain of reasoning, which was well articulated by the New Jersey Court of
Chancery in 1907: “[I]t is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one’s
features is not . . . one’s property.”121
In the influential words of Judge John Clinton Gray, dissenting in Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,122 a “plaintiff has the same property in the right to
be protected against the use of her face for defendant’s commercial purposes, as
she would have, if they were publishing her literary compositions.”123 A per-
son’s natural copyright in their image was legally cognizable because an “indi-
vidual has always been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoy-
ment of that which is his own. The common law regarded his person and
property as inviolate . . . .”124
Why might it be said that law should endow persons with “a property
right” in the “exclusive use”125 of their names and likenesses? Early decisions
protecting identity lamented that the misappropriation of names or likenesses
impaired personal autonomy. The influential 1905 opinion in Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co., for example, forcefully asserted:
The knowledge that one’s features and form are being used [for anoth-
er’s advertising] . . . brings not only the person of an extremely sensitive
nature, but even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a realization
that his liberty has been taken away from him; and, as long as the ad-
vertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be otherwise than con-
scious of the fact that he is for the time being under the control of an-
other, that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without
hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master; and if a man of
true instincts, or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one can be more con-
scious of his enthrallment than he is.126
Modern commentators have continued to suggest that “[a]ll individuals
have a legitimate interest in autonomous self-definition,” and that “[i]f the
overall picture of an individual’s character is made up of the messages conveyed
120. The Protection of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1897, at 16.
121. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 141 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
122. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
123. Id. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 449.
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
126. 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
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by her associational decisions, then unauthorized use of her identity interferes
with her autonomy because the third party takes at least partial control over the
meaning associated with her.”127 The underlying thought is that if persons
cannot control the use of their identities by others, they will become heteron-
omous—controlled by others—and lose the freedom necessary to develop fully
their own personality.
Comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts can be read to support such a
right of control. So, for example, the Restatement (Second) asserts that “the
right created” is “in the nature of a property right.”128 The literal words of
many state statutes, as well as common-law actions, seem to endow persons
with an absolute right to control the use of their names or images by others
(sometimes limited to uses in advertising or for purposes of trade), regardless
of whether they have suffered any specific cognizable injury. In many states,
plaintiffs need neither plead nor prove loss of commercial value, nor restitution
of unjust enrichment, nor the impairment of dignity, to obtain both damages
and an injunction for unauthorized uses of their identities.129
Just as copyright holders can control their works at their pleasure (barring
various limitations and defenses), so a right of control would endow plaintiffs
with a right to prohibit uses of their identities by others (barring various limi-
tations and defenses). The right of control is therefore powerful and far-
reaching. Many cases filed under today’s right of publicity may, if pressed, re-
veal claims for a variant of this right. Consider the precise interest at stake
when lawyers object to being listed in online directories without permission,
when Twitter users object to being portrayed in online trading games akin to
127. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV.
225, 231, 282 (2005); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 111 (discussing the right of publicity’s
role in protecting individual liberty and dignitary interests); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?
The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 385, 411-30 (1999) (contending
that the right of publicity is best understood as a “property right grounded in human auton-
omy”); Rothman, supra note 61, at 219 (concluding that the right of publicity is fundamen-
tally intertwined with one’s personality such that its alienability should be barred or severely
limited during one’s lifetime).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a. The Restatement (Second) affirms “the in-
terest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity.” Id.
129. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-772, 6-5-774 (2020); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/40 (West
2020); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019); Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693
N.E.2d 510, 512-15 (1998). The inclusion of statutory damages in right of publicity statutes
lends itself to the same interpretation. The California right of publicity statute, for example,
authorizes statutory damages of $750 for each violation in the absence of any “actual damag-
es.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2020).
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baseball cards, or when historical figures object to being included in video
games or movies.130
Something like a right of control seems also to underlie the burgeoning
worldwide movement to protect data privacy on the basis that there should be
a right of “individual control over personal data.”131 Data privacy is most prom-
inently enshrined in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation,
which affirms that “[n]atural persons should have control of their own person-
al data.”132 Ultimately this concept of control over personal data stems from the
influential Census Act Case of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which
created “a general right of informational self-determination” protecting “the
authority of the individual to decide fundamentally for herself, when and with-
in what limits personal data may be disclosed.”133 As one commentator has ob-
served, such “informational self-determination follows from human autono-
my,” because “in the modern information age, control of information is power.
130. See,, e.g., Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016); Vrdolyak v. Avvo, Inc., 206 F.
Supp. 3d 1384 (N.D. Ill. 2016); De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625
(Ct. App. 2018); Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., 42 Media L. Rep. 2740 (Cal. 2014);
Complaint, Parker v. Hey, Inc., No. CGC-17-556257 (Cal. Jan. 4, 2017).
131. Orla Lynskey, Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario
Costeja Gonzalez, 78 MOD. L. REV. 522, 529 (2015) (citations omitted); see also Avner Levin &
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1009
(2009) (discussing the Western emphasis on control as underpinning developments in pri-
vacy); Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be For-
gotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 993-94 (2018) (comparing
the respective roles of “control” and “dignity” in the right to be forgotten in data privacy and
social life).
132. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
Personal data, which include names and likenesses, is a broad concept that encompasses any
information “relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” Id. at 33; see also The
OECD Privacy Framework, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 41 (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc
/UN8Y-RVNU] (“Of the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment] Member countries more than one-third have so far enacted one or several
laws . . . intended to protect individuals against abuse of data relating to them and to give
them the right access to data with a view to checking their accuracy and appropriateness.”);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1326 (2000) (“The most common definition of information privacy is the
right of the individual to ‘information self-determination.’” (citations omitted)).
133. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American Constitu-
tional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 1001-02 (quoting Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (42) (Ger.) (guaranteeing individuals the fundamental right to
decide for themselves on the disclosure and use of their personal data)).
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Thus, control over personal information is the power to control a measure of
one’s fate. This is indispensable to the free unfolding of personality.”134
Contemporary efforts to protect data privacy are in part motivated by the
oppressive imbalances of power that occur when large organizations, with the
capacity to process immense quantities of data, are given unrestricted access to
personal information.135 It is believed that these imbalances “threaten human
liberty [because] [t]he more that is known about a person, the easier the per-
son is to control.”136
Some of these concerns might meaningfully be addressed by endowing per-
sons with a right of control over their own personal information, including
their identities. But, of course, such a right of control could also vastly constrict
the free circulation of information. Some variant of a right of control, for ex-
ample, underlies Europe’s adoption of a “right to be forgotten,” which threatens
to remove large stretches of public information from internet searches.137
D. The Right of Dignity
If the right of control advances the goal of informational self-determination,
the right of dignity focuses instead on the integrity of personality. It imagines
that identities are formed through processes of socialization, in which existing
social attitudes are incorporated into the very structure of the self.138 Persons
who are formed through socialization cannot be characterized as simply auton-
omous because the very maintenance of their personalities depends upon the
attitudes of others.139 If the value of autonomy strives to promote the independ-
ence of persons, the value of dignity presupposes and protects their interdepend-
ence.
134. Eberle, supra note 133, at 1002; see also J.C. Buitelaar, Privacy: Back to the Roots, 13 GER. L.J.
171, 185 (2012) (“Informational privacy as conceptualized here concerns breaches of the self
which take away the key element of self-determination.”); Edward J. Eberle, The Right to In-
formation Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 965, 974 (“Possession of personal infor-
mation is the power to influence, if not manipulate, human behavior.”).
135. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (2001). See generally COHEN, supra note 113 (discussing
the “personal data economy”); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM:
THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (discussing the
development of surveillance capitalism and its ability to manipulate human behavior).
136. Eberle, supra note 133, at 1001.
137. Post, supra note 131 passim.
138. See Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 475-76 (1997).
139. GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF & SOCIETY 162 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1962) (“A person is a
personality because he belongs to a community . . . . [O]ne has to be a member of a com-
munity to be a self.”).
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In the world as we experience it, persons are sometimes and in some re-
spects self-fashioning, but they are at other times and in other respects reliant
on ongoing intersubjective processes of recognition and validation.140 The so-
called dignitary torts, of which privacy is a prime example, protect persons in-
sofar as we regard them as vulnerable, intersubjective beings who depend upon
the respect of others to sustain the integrity of their own personalities. “Our
‘dignity,’” writes Charles Taylor, “is our sense of ourselves as commanding (at-
titudinal) respect.”141
The dignitary torts protect dignity by enforcing “civility rules” that convey
the respect we deem necessary for the maintenance of our personality.142 The
dignitary torts imagine individuals as dependent upon a complex web of social
norms that sustain their identities as persons worthy of respect. Well-socialized
persons experience the violation of civility rules as offensive, demeaning, and
humiliating.143 We postulate the right of dignity as an ideal tort designed to
protect the integrity of personality from such mental anguish.
Many contemporary right of publicity lawsuits invoke the right of dignity.
The allegations in musician Tom Waits’s lawsuit arising out of the use, in a
Doritos commercial, of music and a voice that sounded like his focused in part
on the public shame and emotional distress he experienced due to the violation
of his strict policy against appearing or singing in advertisements.144 People
who have been arrested have objected to the public posting of their arrest pho-
tos on mugshots.com—a website that until recently offered to remove those
photos for a fee.145 Models have objected to being featured in advertisements
for strip clubs, claiming that such uses cause them shame and embarrass-
140. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
(1995) (imagining three social domains of constitutional law, one of which—community—is
based in shared norms and mores); Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The
Legal Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 163 (John W.
Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) (contrasting community, in which persons are vulnera-
ble, with responsive democracy, in which persons are autonomous).
141. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 15 (1989).
142. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 30, at 959-68.
143. Id.
144. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the Doritos com-
mercial as causing Waits “shock, anger, . . . embarrassment,” and “humiliat[ion]”).
145. See, e.g., Gabiola v. Sarid, No. 16-cv-02076, 2017 WL 4264000, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26,
2017); Second Amended Complaint at 2-3, 38-40, Gabiola v. Mugshots.com, LLC, No. 14-
cv-09351 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2015) (complaining of public shame and embarrassment and
loss of employment). Objections to being placed in the equivalent of a “rogues’ gallery” are
longstanding. See Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 39 So. 499, 500 (La. 1905) (“Where a person is
not guilty, [and] is honest . . . he may obtain an injunction to prevent his photograph from
being sent to the rogues’ gallery.”).
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ment.146 Right of publicity lawsuits also have involved objections to the dis-
semination of intimate photographs and videos of sex acts that have caused
plaintiffs embarrassment, shame, and humiliation.147
The right of dignity was asserted at the beginning of the twentieth century,
when many considered it a “humiliation and mortification” to have one’s image
“displayed in places where he would never go to be gazed upon, at times when
and under circumstances where if he were personally present the sensibilities of
his nature would be severely shocked.”148 One of the most famous right of pub-
licity cases from the early 1900s involved the use of young Abigail Roberson’s
photograph in advertisements for flour.149 Roberson alleged that these adver-
tisements had “greatly humiliated” her due to “the scoffs and jeers of persons
who [had] recognized her face and picture on this advertisement,” and that she
had experienced “great distress and suffering, both in body and mind; that she
was made sick, and suffered a severe nervous shock, was confined to her bed,
and compelled to employ a physician.”150 In the uproar that followed the denial
of Roberson’s claim by the New York Court of Appeals, unauthorized publica-
146. See, e.g., Complaint at 4-8, Timed Out LLC v. Pajounia, No. BC599207 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
27, 2015).
147. See, e.g., Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917-18, 933-34 (N.D. Ohio 2004);
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828, 838-40 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Gawker
Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1198-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Bullard v. MRA
Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ga. 2013); see also Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d
12, 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting right of publicity claims by sex-trafficking victims
against online classified advertising because the content was posted by third parties). We
note that a number of states have begun to pass targeted intimate-image or “revenge porn”
laws; these wrongs may fall within the right of publicity’s protections and specifically within
what we call the right of dignity. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2020); CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5 (West 2020); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606 (2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09 (2020). Several of these provi-
sions have been held constitutional. See People v. Austin, No. 123910, 2019 WL 5287962, *5-
22 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2019); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 798-814 (Vt. 2019); State v. Culver,
918 N.W.2d 103, 107-114 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
148. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
149. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
150. Id. at 442. The Appellate Division, which upheld Roberson’s claim, explicitly did so on the
ground that the unauthorized use of her photograph caused a harm that was analogous to
that caused by the dignitary tort of libel:
I can see no distinction in principle between an act which, without threaten-
ing physical harm, injures the plaintiff ’s reputation by words spoken in re-
spect of it and the like act, which injures her feelings and diminishes the re-
spect with which she is held in the community by saying or doing something
in regard to her which tends to bring her into unnecessary and unwarranta-
ble notice.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 71 N.Y.S. 876, 879 (App. Div. 1901).
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tions of photographs were denounced as “outrages,” as “savage and horrible
practices, practices incompatible with the claims of the community in which
they are allowed to be committed with impunity to be called a civilized com-
munity.”151
In retrospect, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact source of this outrage. It
might have been the mere publication of an unauthorized image of Roberson.
It might have been the use of that image to advertise the defendant’s flour
products.152 It might have been that the defendant’s advertisements were “con-
spicuously posted and displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons, and other pub-
lic places.”153 Or it might have been particular sensitivity to commandeering
the photograph of a teenage girl.154 The unauthorized appropriation of identity
can be experienced as mortifying for all kinds of reasons and in all kinds of cir-
cumstances.
To track the interests protected by the right of dignity, however, plaintiffs
should have to show that defendants’ misappropriation of their identities
would be “highly offensive” to a reasonable person. Three of the four privacy
torts defined in the Restatement (Second)—public disclosure of private facts, in-
trusion, and false light—are explicitly formulated to penalize only “highly
offensive” conduct, which is to say conduct that can be presumed to cause emo-
tional damage because it is inconsistent with accepted norms of respect. The
right of dignity should also contain this requirement.
So understood, a right of dignity would fill a gap in the existing dignitary
torts. A defendant’s use of a plaintiff ’s identity may not be defamatory; it may
not reveal private facts; it may not be intended to produce intense emotional
distress; it may not place a plaintiff in a false light; and yet it may still be highly
151. The Right of Privacy, supra note 114, at 8. Two years after the decision in Roberson, when Al-
ton Parker, who had written the majority opinion for the Court of Appeals, ran for President
of the United States as the Democratic Party nominee, he declared “that he did not propose
to be photographed by camera men.” Parker Taken to Task by an Indignant Woman, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 1904, at 1. Parker announced: “I reserve the right to put my hands in my
pockets and assume comfortable attitudes without being everlastingly afraid that I shall be
snapped by some fellow with a camera.” Id. Roberson wrote him a long, sophisticated, and
indignant letter, citing back to him his own opinion. “Naturally,” Roberson concluded, “the
camera fiend feels licensed to annoy you and your family in the manner in which you your-
self suggested, at least within the borders of this state.” Judge Parker and the Right to Privacy,
ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Aug. 1, 1904, at 2. The contretemps received nationwide publicity.
152. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 63 (N.C. 1938).
153. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442.
154. Roberson was seventeen years of age at the time the lawsuit was filed. See Her Beauty a Pos-
session: A New York Court Declares a Woman’s Face Property, EVENING TIMES (D.C.), July 24,
1901, at 5 (describing Roberson as eighteen years old in 1901); see also ROTHMAN, supra note
1, at 17-18, 190 n.12 (discussing the role of gender in privacy claims of the late 1800s).
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offensive.155 As with the other privacy torts, the question of what ought to
count as a “highly offensive” use will be highly contextual and historically vari-
able.156
ii . the current first amendment chaos
The right of publicity tort may be unique in American law in the startlingly
disparate array of interests that it can protect. In any given case, the right of
publicity can be invoked to vindicate one or more of the four interests we have
described. The failure to distinguish these interests manifestly contributes to
the chaos surrounding efforts to engage in consistent and clear-eyed First
Amendment analysis of right of publicity claims.
Modern constitutional analysis of the right of publicity can be traced back
to Zacchini, in which the Supreme Court considered “whether the First and
Fourteenth Amendments immunized” a defendant news station “from damag-
es for its alleged infringement of petitioner’s state-law ‘right of publicity.’”157
After distinguishing false light privacy-based claims, which the Court believed
involved “an entirely different tort from the ‘right of publicity,’” the Court held
that the First Amendment did not offer constitutional immunity.158
155. See Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of
Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 213 (1999); Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2009).
156. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 30, at 963-64.
157. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977).
158. Id. at 571. The main precedent distinguished by the Supreme Court in Zacchini was Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), which was brought under New York’s right of privacy stat-
ute, sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 2019). That statute provides New York’s only basis for both right of publicity
and right of privacy claims, creating liability if a plaintiff ’s “name, portrait or picture” is
used without consent “for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade.” CIV. RIGHTS
§ 50. Thus, if Zacchini had sued under New York law, his claim would perforce have been
brought under the very same statute as in Hill. See, e.g., Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 447
N.Y.S.2d 252 (App. Div.) (action brought under section 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law), aff ’d, 440 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1982); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 106 N.Y.S.2d 553
(App. Div. 1951) (same), aff ’d, 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952). Yet in Zacchini the Supreme
Court was clear that the tort at issue in Hill was fundamentally different from the tort at is-
sue in Zacchini, which illustrates how important it is to distinguish the particular interests
that any given right of publicity claim is brought to vindicate. We note that by the time of
publication New York may have added an additional basis for a right of publicity claim. In
the summer of 2020, the New York legislature passed a bill that would add a postmortem
right of publicity. It is currently awaiting the Governor’s signature. See S.5959D, 2019-2020
Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2020).
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By rejecting a First Amendment defense in the context of news—a medium
typically accorded the highest constitutional protection—Zacchini sparked a
virtual explosion of right of publicity claims and statutes across the nation.159
Although the right of performance at issue in Zacchini is frequently not in-
volved in right of publicity claims, Zacchini was nevertheless cited for the broad
proposition that “[t]here is no First Amendment privilege with respect to the
appropriation of another’s name or likeness for commercial purposes.”160
As right of publicity claims proliferated, it quickly became apparent that
such a broad reading of Zacchini was untenable. Zacchini was distinguished by
some courts as “not an ordinary right of publicity case: the defendant television
station had appropriated the plaintiff ’s entire act.”161 Although the criterion of
an “entire act” makes sense in the context of a right of performance, it is virtu-
ally incomprehensible in the context of the right of commercial value, the right
of control, or the right of dignity. Yet it was only the rare court that could pre-
cisely articulate Zacchini’s intrinsic limitations: “[T]he distinction between the
value of a person’s identity and the value of his performance explains why Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court’s sole case involv-
ing a right of publicity claim, is a red herring.”162
159. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 145-53.
160. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585, 601-02 n.79 (D. Md. 1981), aff ’d in part,
rev’d in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982). For the persistent influence of Zacchini’s holding,
see, for example, Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 540 (W.D. Tex. 1980);
and Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372-74 (Mo. 2003). See also ROTHMAN, supra
note 1, at 143-54 (discussing the expansion and proliferation of the right of publicity in the
wake of Zacchini); Rothman, supra note 87, at 302-15 (considering the significant influence
of Zacchini on the development of right of publicity law).
161. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 (Cal. 2001) (emphasis add-
ed); see also Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 624 (7th Cir.
2011) (“The distinction between coverage or reporting on one hand, and broadcast of an ‘en-
tire act’ on the other, was central to Zacchini.”); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915, 956 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting) (“Zacchini has been criticized as being very
‘narrowly drawn’ in that it involved the wholesale reproduction of a live ‘entire act’ . . . .”);
Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 (1979) (observing that Zacchini did not provide a “particularly
clear standard, and it is unlikely to be available in the majority of cases,” leaving courts with-
out sufficient guidance to make First Amendment determinations in right of publicity cases
and making “inconsistent holdings . . . virtually inevitable”).
162. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996)
(citation omitted). The court also pointed out that “Zacchini . . . complained of the appro-
priation of the economic value of his performance, not the economic value of his identity.” Id.
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Many courts nevertheless continue to invoke Zacchini in contexts that do
not involve performances.163 This common error suggests the need rigorously
to separate the four distinct interests we identified in Part I. Because the “entire
act” standard of Zacchini does not easily translate into other contexts, courts
have found themselves struggling to craft supplementary doctrines to define
appropriate constitutional defenses in right of publicity cases.
The upshot can only be described as pandemonium, which one commenta-
tor has even compared to a “dumpster fire.”164 “[T]he point of confusion most
associated with the right of publicity law is its interplay with the First Amend-
ment.”165 “Courts, in struggling to accommodate” the “competing interests”
between “a celebrity’s right of publicity and the public’s right to free expression
embodied in the First Amendment,” have “failed to articulate a clear standard
to resolve the conflict, resulting in a confusing morass of inconsistent, incom-
plete, or mutually exclusive approaches, tests, and standards.”166
The situation goes far beyond a mere circuit split. Courts across the coun-
try apply multiple different approaches to constitutional analysis.167 Speakers
are left with little guidance as to basic questions, such as when they may legally
use the names or likenesses of real people in video games, comic books, board
games, works of art, song titles, congratulatory messages, retweets, celebrity-
oriented blogs, and even in news reporting. The unpredictability caused by the
“courts’ sloppy and often inconsistent tests for weighing the right of publicity
163. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009) (arguing that Zac-
chini establishes that “when a media outlet appropriates ‘some aspect’ of an individual ‘that
would have market value and for which he would normally pay,’ without that individual’s
permission, the media outlet is subject to damages in a tort suit for violation of the right of
publicity”); Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“The Su-
preme Court [in Zacchini] indicated that the right to publicity was constitutional and did
comport with the First Amendment.”); Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 805 (citing to Zacchini in
rejecting a First Amendment defense in the context of a lithograph sold in multiple copies
and on t-shirts); TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 372-74 (same in the context of comic books).
164. William McGeveran, Selfmarks, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 362 (2018).
165. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 954 (Clay, J., dissenting).
166. Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Cap-
ture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND.
L.J. 47, 48 (1995) (observing “the massive confusion surrounding the conflict between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment”). Kwall recognized that the “lack” of “a princi-
pled and consistent method of resolving the conflict between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment . . . stems from the vast array of potential types of appropriations.” Id. at
47.
167. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 145-48; Kwall, supra note 155, at 1356-57 (identifying five different
“balancing tests for determining how the right of publicity should be applied in cases pre-
senting First Amendment challenges”).
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and First Amendment rights”168 chills speech and incentivizes jurisdictional
gamesmanship.169
It suffices for present purposes merely to sketch the chaos that currently
envelops the field.170 One approach that courts have taken to reconcile rights of
publicity with freedom of speech is bluntly to weigh the value of the use
against the likely injury to the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit took this approach
in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media.171
Balancing the constitutional value of the use against the likely injury to the
plaintiffs, the court held that the First Amendment insulated the defendant’s
online fantasy-baseball games from liability under Missouri’s right of publicity
law. The defendant could use players’ names and statistics because the infor-
mation was in the public domain, and the use did not materially undermine the
baseball players’ incentives to engage in “productive activities.”172
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Missouri applied a different First
Amendment analysis to a claim asserted under the very same state right of pub-
licity law. Using what is now called the predominant-purpose test, the court held
that the First Amendment did not insulate a comic-book author from liability
for naming a character “Tony Twistelli” after a professional hockey player, Tony
Twist.173 The court decided that the author did not make “an expressive com-
ment” about Twist, but instead “predominantly exploit[ed] the commercial
value” of Twist’s identity.174 The court concluded that naming a character after
168. Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment in the
Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1472 (2015).
169. Cf. Experience Hendrix LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com LTD, 762 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2004)
(enforcing Jimi Hendrix’s postmortem right of publicity under Washington law because
that state allows the estates of those who died domiciled elsewhere to bring claims in that
state even if the deceased’s domicile denies such rights); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Fo-
rum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 passim (2016) (discussing strategic filing of patent claims
in particular jurisdictions).
170. For a detailed analysis of the various First Amendment tests currently employed and some
critiques of them, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 145-53. There is a large scholarly literature
critiquing these tests. See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transform-
ativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against
Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003); Kwall, supra note 166; Mark S.
Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface,
23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Pub-
licity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003).
171. 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
172. Id. at 824.
173. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
174. Id. at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 170, at 500).
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Twist was “predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products ra-
ther than an artistic or literary expression.”175
In a seemingly similar case, the Supreme Court of California took a differ-
ent approach and applied what has become known as the transformative-work
test. Two well-known rock-star brothers, Johnny and Edgar Winter, objected
to the invocation of their names and likenesses in a comic-book series. In con-
trast to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the Supreme Court of California held
that the use was protected by the First Amendment. The California court ap-
plied the transformative-work test to conclude that the comic book trans-
formed the Winter brothers’ identities by placing them in a new context,
changing their names (to the Autumn brothers) and altering their physical ap-
pearance.176
California’s transformative-work test derives from one consideration used
in copyright law’s multifactor fair use doctrine. The test considers “whether the
work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”177 This approach
was first adopted by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., in which the court held that a realistic portrait of the
Three Stooges infringed the deceased comedians’ rights of publicity. The court
used the test to reject a First Amendment defense because the portrait at issue
(which was also printed on multiple t-shirts) was realistic and did not add sig-
nificant additional material or commentary, a feature that presumably would
have turned the work into a transformative one.178
The exact meaning and method of applying the transformative-work test
remains disputed. Courts that claim to apply this analysis do so in different
ways. The Sixth Circuit said it was applying this test (along with several oth-
ers) to justify its conclusion that a realistic print of Tiger Woods winning the
Masters Tournament was transformative and therefore protected by the First
Amendment.179 But it is hard to square this conclusion with the California Su-
preme Court’s analysis in Comedy III. Although Rick Rush, the artist who pro-
duced the portrait of Woods, included in his painting the figures of other golf-
ers looking down at Woods, the style and portrait of Woods himself was just as
realistic as the portrait of the Three Stooges.
175. Id.
176. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
177. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
178. Id. at 811.
179. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 934-36, 938 (6th Cir. 2003). To compare the
images of these two works, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 149-50.
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Some courts, notably the Third and Ninth Circuits, have developed what
appears to be an unacknowledged variation on this transformative-work test.180
These courts do not focus on whether an overall work is transformative, but in-
stead on whether a plaintiff ’s specific identity has been transformed. This nar-
rower approach requires that a defendant “distort[]” or “transmogrif[y]” a per-
son’s identity “for purposes of lampoon, parody, or caricature.”181 The use must
be “more of a ‘fanciful, creative character’ than an ‘imitative character.’”182 This
narrower version of the test appears on its face to disfavor more realistic por-
trayals of people.
A more speech-protective doctrine that has been adopted by some jurisdic-
tions is sometimes called the relatedness test. This approach constitutionally
protects the use of individuals’ identities in expressive works unless the under-
lying work is “‘wholly unrelated’ to the individual” or the use is a “disguised
advertisement for the sale of goods or services or a collateral commercial prod-
uct.”183 Some courts also allow liability under this approach if the use is “solely
to attract attention to a work.”184 Some version of this approach has been
adopted by the Second, Fifth, and, at times, Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals, as
well as by Kentucky and New York courts, sometimes as an internal limit on
right of publicity claims under state law, and sometimes as an independent
First Amendment test.185
180. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 146. Although federal courts are not bound by a state court’s in-
terpretation of the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has claimed to be
relying on the California Supreme Court’s approach in cases involving California’s right of
publicity laws.
181. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2009).
182. Id. at 911 (quoting Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616, 618 (Ct. App.
2006)). Compare Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165-70 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting
transformative-work analysis as about transforming the identity of the individual depicted),
and In re Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276-79 (9th Cir.
2013) (same), with Hart, 717 F.3d at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (interpreting the transforma-
tive-work test to refer to transforming the identity of the individual depicted), and in In re
NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1284-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same).
183. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989).
184. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995)).
185. See id. at 460-61; Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994); Rogers, 875 F.2d
at 1004-05; Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765-66 (E.D. Mich.
2008); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 528-30 (Ky. 2001); Frosch v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition has adopted this approach as a limit on the scope of the right of publicity tort,
rather than as an independent defense. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
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The relatedness test is often also referred to as the Rogers test because of its
adoption in the Second Circuit case Rogers v. Grimaldi.186 In that case, Ginger
Rogers sued over the use of her name in the title of the film Ginger and Fred,
directed by the famous Italian director Federico Fellini. The movie told the sto-
ry of two Italian entertainers known as the Italian version of the famous Ameri-
can dancing pair of Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers. The court held that the
use of Rogers’s name in the movie title was relevant to the content of the movie
and was not a disguised advertisement for something other than the film itself.
Strictly construing Oregon’s right of publicity law to avoid a conflict with the
First Amendment, the court concluded that no right of publicity claim could
proceed.187
Yet another approach has been to apply strict scrutiny. In Sarver v. Chartier, a
Ninth Circuit panel held that in the context of a movie the right of publicity
constituted a content-based restriction, and that it should therefore be subject
to strict scrutiny.188 The case involved a lawsuit brought by an army sergeant
who claimed that a character in a movie was based on his identity and life sto-
ry.189 The court concluded that a right of publicity claim in such an instance
was patently unconstitutional. Sarver, however, limited the application of strict
scrutiny to cases in which the plaintiff was not a celebrity.190
186. The relatedness test in Rogers used in right of publicity cases is different from a distinct and
widely-adopted “Rogers test” that applies to First Amendment defenses to false endorsement
and trademark-based claims brought under the Lanham Act in the context of “artistic ex-
pression.” The two tests were developed in the same case. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (con-
cluding that there can be no liability under the Lanham Act “if [the allegedly infringing use]
has some artistic relevance unless [it] explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of
the work”). We note that although the Lanham Act Rogers test is widely applied in trade-
mark cases involving expressive works, it is less frequently adopted by courts analyzing First
Amendment defenses to right of publicity claims. Compare Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d
1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Rogers test as a basis to reject a false endorsement claim
under the Lanham Act), with Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2015) (re-
jecting a First Amendment defense to a right of publicity claim and the application of the
Rogers analysis in the context of the same video game at issue in Brown).
187. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05.
188. 813 F.3d 891, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2016) (identifying California’s right of publicity law as a “con-
tent-based speech restriction” which “cannot stand unless Sarver can show a compelling
state interest in preventing the defendants’ speech”); cf. Pooley v. Nat’l Hole-In-One Ass’n,
89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 (D. Ariz. 2000) (distinguishing between “communicative” speech,
which “wins over the right of publicity” and “is entitled to the highest level of First
Amendment protection,” and “commercial” speech, against which “the right of publicity
generally wins”).
189. Sarver also objected to reporting on his experiences as a bomb-disposal expert using his ac-
tual name in Playboy and Reader’s Digest. Sarver, 813 F.3d at 896.
190. Id. at 904-06. Previous Ninth Circuit decisions had applied the transformative-use test in
right of publicity cases in which First Amendment defenses had been asserted, including in
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As is apparent from this brief survey, courts are flailing about in a sea of in-
consistent, vague, and unhelpful First Amendment tests.191 This is unsurpris-
ing given that careful First Amendment doctrine requires “[p]recision of regu-
lation.”192 Constitutional scrutiny must always be addressed to the exact state
interest at stake in the regulation of speech. Each of the four distinct state in-
terests that we set forth in Part I requires its own unique form of First Amend-
ment review. One size will not fit all. As can readily be deduced from the con-
temporary disarray, the effort to fashion a single all-purpose First Amendment
test to analyze all the various interests that sail under the flag of the “right of
publicity” will produce nothing but chaos.
iii . reconsidering the first amendment and the right of
publicity
In this Part, we analyze how First Amendment considerations ought to be
matched with the distinct interests protected by state right of publicity laws as
separately identified in Part I. We do not expect that isolating and addressing
plaintiffs’ particular interests will remove all constitutional ambiguity; hard
cases will undoubtedly remain. But we hope that our approach will greatly clar-
ify constitutional analysis and facilitate the orderly and rational development of
the law.
Before proceeding to this work, however, we must introduce another im-
portant dimension to First Amendment analysis of right of publicity claims.
the context of video games. Davis, 775 F.3d at 1177-78 (rejecting a First Amendment defense
in the context of alleged uses of professional football players’ likenesses in video games); In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.
2013) (same in the context of student-athletes). The Sarver court tried to avoid these prece-
dents by limiting the application of strict scrutiny to cases in which a plaintiff did not pos-
sess an identity that had previously established commercial value. For a critique of this as-
pect of Sarver, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 151-53. At least one Ninth Circuit panel has also
used the actual malice test to construct a First Amendment defense in a right of publicity
case. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).
191. For critiques of the transformativeness test, see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 146-51;
Dougherty, supra note 170, at 28-35, 69-77; Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face:
Images and the Right of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 169-88 (2015); and Volokh, supra
note 170, at 913-25. For critiques of the predominant-purpose test, see Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013), which describes the “Predominant Use Test” as “subjective at
best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case calls upon judges to act as both impartial jurists
and discerning art critics”; and ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 147-51. For critiques of the relat-
edness test, see Hart, 717 F.3d at 157-58; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Ky.
2001) (Keller, J., dissenting); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003); and
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 146-51.
192. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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Just as any given right of publicity claim may involve distinct state interests, so
too may it involve distinct First Amendment interests, depending on the pre-
cise kind of communication a state seeks to regulate. The resolution of any giv-
en claim will therefore require assessing the state interests asserted by a plain-
tiff in light of the relevant constitutional interests asserted by a defendant.193
In Section III.A, we describe three distinct types of communication that re-
ceive three different forms of constitutional scrutiny under the First Amend-
ment. In Section III.B, we match these three constitutional interests with the
four right of publicity interests identified in Part I.
A. Tiers of First Amendment Review
To evaluate properly First Amendment defenses in the context of right of
publicity claims, courts must articulate the distinct constitutional values at
stake when a defendant uses a person’s name, likeness, voice, or other indicia of
identity. Plaintiffs assert right of publicity claims for all sorts of uses of their
persona—in films, in newspapers, in advertisements, in photographs, in video
games, in posters, on t-shirts, on coffee mugs, on pencil erasers, and so on ad
infinitum. Not all of these communicative acts will be treated the same for pur-
poses of the First Amendment.
Many years ago, Harry Kalven, Jr., suggested that the Supreme Court had
adopted what he called a “two-level free-speech theory.”194 The Court spoke as
if all speech was protected by the full force of First Amendment doctrine except
for certain “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the
bar”―categories like fighting words or obscenity―to which the Court would ex-
tend no constitutional protection at all.195 Although the Court has recently reit-
erated the two-level theory,196 it has been plain for a long time that the theory
is a poor and inaccurate description of actual First Amendment jurisprudence.
There are many forms of communication that lie “outside the core or cores
of the freedom of speech protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment” that receive
193. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 155, 157 (contending that “[c]ourts must evaluate and scruti-
nize the interests purportedly served by the right of publicity,” as well as “the competing
speech interests jeopardized by enforcing a right of publicity”).
194. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10.
195. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 747
(1971)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). As the Court famously put it in Chaplinsky, these categories con-
stitute “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” 315 U.S. at 571-72.
196. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010).
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distinctive (and diminished) kinds of constitutional review.197 Most notably,
“commercial speech” has explicitly been regulated in ways that core First
Amendment protections forbid.198 Speech that embodies intellectual property
also receives diminished First Amendment scrutiny.199 There are yet other
forms of communication outside the “historic and traditional categories” that
do not seem to trigger any First Amendment protection at all,200 like warnings
in product liability cases201 or lawyers’ advice in actions for professional mal-
practice.202
It is impossible to negotiate the complex geography of the right of publicity
without recognizing these distinctions. One must appreciate the distinct First
Amendment values at play when the state seeks to regulate a portrait hanging
in a museum as distinguished from a portrait imprinted on a cereal box. A large
part of the difficulty is that official First Amendment jurisprudence is quite
crude when it comes to making such distinctions. The Supreme Court has a
penchant for abstract, categorical, and overbroad doctrinal pronouncements
that do not seem to correspond at all to our existing legal landscape.
So, for example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Court recently opined:
Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communica-
tive content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified
197. Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1181, 1185 (1988).
198. Id.; see, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980).
199. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003) (concluding that speech can be re-
stricted in the context of copyright laws in part because such laws produce more speech);
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535-41 (1987) (rejecting a
First Amendment defense even to nonconfusing speech in the face of a quasi-trademark
claim); see ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 143-45, 220-21 nn.11-13; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Vo-
lokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-69
(1998); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1192, 1203-04 (1970); Rothman, supra note 87,
at 312.
200. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“Numerous examples could
be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amend-
ment . . . .”); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explo-
ration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2004) (“Although the First
Amendment refers to freedom of ‘speech,’ much speech remains totally untouched by it.”);
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 269-72 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 346 (2015); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
318, 320-21 (2018).
201. See, e.g., Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
202. See, e.g., Estate of Spencer v. Gavin, 946 A.2d 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
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only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.
Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase “content based”
requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech “on its face”
draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial
distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech
by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regu-
lated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn
based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to
strict scrutiny.203
If the doctrine propounded in Reed is taken at face value, the right of pub-
licity is in deep constitutional trouble. The right is unquestionably a content-
based regulation that “target[s] speech based on its communicative content.”204
It imposes liability if the name, likeness, or voice of a plaintiff is identified, but
not otherwise. Because few speech regulations survive strict scrutiny, the crude
doctrinal structure proposed by Reed would radically restrict the right of pub-
licity, perhaps eradicating it entirely except possibly for claims rooted in confu-
sion. We hardly think that outcome likely, however, because the tort is so deep-
ly entrenched in our legal system. It is more plausible to regard the language in
Reed as imprecise overstatement.
Courts have not developed very useful doctrine to clarify when the robust
protections of Reed apply and when they do not. In the context of the right of
publicity, we propose a rough tripartite division of communicative acts, which,
if taken together, will encompass the vast majority of right of publicity actions,
and which, if taken separately, will facilitate clearer and more appropriate con-
stitutional review. A defendant’s misappropriation of a plaintiff ’s identity can
occur in public discourse,205 in commercial speech,206 or in (or on) commodities.207
203. 576 U.S. 155, 163-64 (2015) (citations omitted); see also Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Con-
sultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (plurality opinion) (affirming the holding of Reed that
content discrimination should be determined by whether a statute on its face treats speech
differently based upon its content and that statutes that discriminate on the basis of content
should be subject to strict scrutiny); Reed, 576 U.S. at 169 (“[A] speech regulation targeted
at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints
within that subject matter.” (citation omitted)).
204. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
205. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460-61 (2011); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Die-
go, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
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The nature of constitutional scrutiny that a right of publicity claim should re-
ceive will depend upon the category to which a court assigns the potentially in-
fringing use.
1. Public Discourse
Adopting the language of the Supreme Court, we designate as “public dis-
course”208 the core forms of speech that receive the full array of essential First
Amendment protections. Content and viewpoint discrimination are presump-
tively forbidden within public discourse because, as Chief Justice Roberts has
proclaimed, a “vibrant public discourse . . . is at the foundation of our democ-
racy.”209
Public discourse is not defined by its content but by its function. Because
democracy is essentially “government by public opinion,”210 public discourse is
composed of the communicative acts deemed necessary for the formation of
public opinion. The basic thought is that our government will remain demo-
cratically legitimate so long as government is responsive to public opinion and
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012); Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse, supra note 30, at 626-84.
206. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622-24 (1995); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 473-81 (1989); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
561-66 (1980).
207. Apart from these three distinct categories, there is also a unique class of communicative acts
that are published in outlets or formats that are ordinarily classified as public discourse, but
that are nevertheless denominated as speech about matters of purely private concern. This
class of communicative acts does not fit cleanly into any of the three categories of speech we
discuss, is not well integrated into First Amendment doctrine, is only rarely invoked, and
tends to arise uniquely in the context of the right of dignity. We shall discuss it in Section
III.B.4. See infra notes 351-368 and accompanying text.
208. See Nat’l Review, Inc. v. Mann, 140 S. Ct. 344 (mem.) (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460-61; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515; Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971).
209. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concur-
ring). One need not adopt a democratic theory of the First Amendment to believe that some
forms of speech are properly given more constitutional protection than others or to support
the rough tripartite division of communicative acts that we propose. On the relationship be-
tween democracy, public discourse, and content discrimination, see Robert C. Post, The
Classic First Amendment Tradition Under Stress: Freedom of Speech and the University, in THE
FREE SPEECH CENTURY 106 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019).
210. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 275 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ. Press
2008) (1928).
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so long as individuals are free to participate in the formation of public opin-
ion.211
In modern states, public opinion is underwritten by a public sphere that is
sustained by a “structural skeleton” of “media for the communication of ide-
as,”212 like books, films, magazines, art, music, or newspapers.213 Public opin-
ion is often formed in the communicative exchanges that occur through these
and similar media. Speech within such media is presumptively public dis-
course.214 This is true regardless of whether the speech appears in low-brow
media, like gossipy articles in the National Enquirer,215 or in newer media, like
blog posts216 or social media.217
Public discourse is not defined merely as speech that Robert Bork might
have categorized as “political,” which is to say “speech concerned with govern-
mental behavior, policy or personnel.”218 In a democracy what becomes “politi-
cal” in Bork’s sense is a result of how the public chooses to exercise its judg-
ment. The First Amendment prohibits the state from setting the agenda of
211. See POST, supra note 205, at 18-22, 27-28; Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1063-68, 1072-79 (2016).
212. Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1276 (1995);
see id. at 1253-55.
213. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (granting First Amendment pro-
tection to motion pictures because they “are a significant medium for the communication of
ideas”); Post, supra note 212, at 1253-55.
214. The presumption is defeasible. Speech within a medium may, for example, constitute un-
protected obscenity. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 496 n.35 (2011).
215. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
216. Cf. First Amended Complaint, Witherspoon v. Mktg. Advantages Int’l, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-
07847-RSWL-SS (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2013); Jennifer E. Rothman, L.A. Court Allows
Reese Witherspoon to Proceed with Right of Publicity Claim Against Jeweler, ROTHMAN’S
ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:30 PM PT), https://www
.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/revised-la-court-allows-reese-
witherspoon-proceed-right-publicity-claim-against [https://perma.cc/4HW7-K4SH].
217. Cf. Complaint, Grande-Butera v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-07600 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
2019); Eriq Gardner, Katherine Heigl Ends Lawsuit over Duane Reade Tweet (Exclusive), HOL-
LYWOOD REP. (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:20 PM PT), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/katherine-heigl-ends-lawsuit-duane-728552 [https://perma.cc/X5ZC-W7Z3]; Julia Ja-
cobs, Ariana Grande Sues Forever 21 over ‘Look-Alike Model’ in Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/03/arts/music/ariana-grande-forever-21.html
[https://perma.cc/H9EN-JPM8]; Jennifer E. Rothman, Ariana Grande Sues Forever 21 over
Social Media Posts, ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (Sept. 10, 2019, 12:30
PM PT), https://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/ariana-grande-
sues-forever-21-over-social-media-posts [https://perma.cc/QA6M-95D4].
218. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20, 26-
28 (1971).
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public attention, and in this way it protects the processes by which public opin-
ion is formed.219 Public opinion often comes to know itself through discussion
about celebrities like Clint Eastwood and Reese Witherspoon—not to mention
reality-TV star Donald Trump.220 Public discourse is thus not limited to mat-
ters that are overtly about governance; it includes broader communicative ac-
tivities such as art, music, and comedy.221
2. Commercial Speech
Not all speech, however, is public discourse. A second tranche of communi-
cation consists of what courts have called “commercial speech.”222 Commercial
speech was initially defined as speech for advertising purposes in the context of
promoting nonexpressive products or services.223 The Supreme Court has
called the distinction between public discourse and commercial speech a
“common-sense” one.224 Although we recognize that this distinction has some-
times proven difficult to articulate,225 it is often decisive in right of publicity
cases.226
219. POST, supra note 205, at 19-21; Balkin, supra note 211, at 1063-68, 1072, 1075-79 (contending
that public discourse includes participation in popular culture); Post, supra note 209, at 108-
09.
220. See Balkin, supra note 211, at 1063-68, 1072, 1075-79; Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Dem-
ocratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (2004); see also Thomas E. Kadri, Drawing Trump Naked: Curbing the Right of Publicity to
Protect Public Discourse, 78 MD. L. REV. 899 (2019) (analyzing possible right of publicity law-
suits Trump could bring); David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser:
How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political
Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651 (2005) (discussing the former movie star and then Gov-
ernor of California’s right of publicity lawsuit against the sale of bobblehead dolls that used
his name and likeness); cf. JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 95, 239 (1988) (describing tel-
evision and other popular media as treating viewers and readers as part of a “semiotic de-
mocracy”).
221. POST, supra note 205, at 19-20; Balkin, supra note 211, at 1057, 1062, 1067-68, 1071-79, 1089
(contending that public discourse encompasses protections for cultural discourse, including
nonrepresentational and nonverbal art and music).
222. For a discussion of commercial speech, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Com-
mercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 passim (2000).
223. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-70
(1976).
224. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
225. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 676-80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted) (contending that the shoe company’s
statements about its labor policies and practices were not purely commercial speech); Jordan
v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 522 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing the district court and
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The key determinant of whether a communicative act constitutes commer-
cial speech is the constitutional value that courts perceive to be at stake in the
act.227 The protections that courts accord to public discourse ultimately derive
from Justice Brandeis’s eloquent warning “that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people” and “that public discussion is a political duty.”228 Speech that
advertises nonexpressive products and services without any analogous sense of
civic orientation is typically deemed commercial speech because it is regarded
merely as a communication that sells goods or services rather than one that is
addressed to shaping public attitudes about public matters. Within public dis-
course, courts protect the autonomy of speakers, who are regarded as demo-
cratic sovereigns authorized to determine the content of “that public opinion
which is the final source of government in a democratic state.”229 But within
commercial speech, speakers have traditionally not been characterized as sover-
eign in the same way.230 Instead, the constitutional value of commercial speech
has long been said to lie in how it serves the interests of listeners. The Court
has characterized commercial speech as constitutionally valuable because it
serves “the informational function of advertising.”231
concluding that a congratulatory page in a magazine was commercial speech); Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he boundary between
commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to be clearly delineated . . . .”); Kasky v. Ni-
ke, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258-63 (Cal. 2002) (holding that the shoe company’s statements about
its labor policies and practices were commercial speech); Rothman, supra note 31, at 1973-77
(describing the particular challenges of categorizing commercial speech in intellectual prop-
erty cases); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1130 (2006) (“From the beginning,
the commercial speech doctrine has threatened to unravel free speech theory . . . .”).
226. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“[The] dis-
tinction between speech that proposes a commercial transaction, and speech that comments
on matters of public interest has been applied regularly to distinguish protected speech from
actionable misuse of a person’s name or likeness for commercial gain.”); see, e.g., Brown v.
Showtime Networks, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 418, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
227. See POST, supra note 205, at 27-60 (concluding that the First Amendment protects commer-
cial speech to maintain the “democratic competence” of listeners); Robert C. Post, Compelled
Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 871-73 (2015); Post, supra note 222 passim.
228. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
229. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
230. Robert C. Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165,
171-72 (2015).
231. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
“[C]ommercial speech has a different social function from public discourse. Commercial
speech doctrine protects the ability of listeners to receive information, rather than the au-
tonomy of advertisers to express themselves.” Balkin, supra note 211, at 1084.
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Commercial speech may accordingly be suppressed if it is false or mislead-
ing.232 The Court has explicitly held that “there can be no constitutional objec-
tion to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform
the public about lawful activity.”233 Without this holding, the government’s
ability to regulate deceptive advertising could be greatly impaired. By contrast,
merely misleading speech cannot be penalized in public discourse, and the state
must provide “breathing space” even for untruthful speech.234 Even if commer-
cial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, content discrimina-
tion is nevertheless allowed so long as “the asserted governmental interest is
substantial” and “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-
serted, and . . . it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that inter-
est.”235
We recognize that some recent pronouncements by the Court have suggest-
ed increased protections for commercial speech that seem to express solicitude
for the interests of commercial speakers, as though they were exercising the
same kind of autonomous democratic sovereignty as participants in public dis-
course.236 But it is notable that even those who are otherwise skeptical of the
difference between commercial speech and public discourse nevertheless give
the distinction ample respect in the context of trademark claims,237 and we ex-
232. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974);
Post, supra note 222, at 29.
233. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
234. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
278-82 (1964); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 782-84, 786-96 (8th Cir. 2014).
235. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Although several recent cases, including Reed, have suggested
that review of commercial speech may be becoming increasingly robust, the intermediate
scrutiny standard of Central Hudson nevertheless remains in place.
236. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566-71 (2011); United States v. United
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409-11 (2001); Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate
Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 passim (2016) (exploring recent D.C. Circuit decisions reflecting
the same tendency).
237. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535, 536 n.15
(1987); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1015-18 (3d Cir. 2008); U.S. Olympic
Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1205-06 (D. Colo. 2001). Compare Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (employing the commer-
cial/noncommercial use distinction for a trademark dilution claim), with Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 652-53 (1990) (con-
testing the assumption that commercial speech deserves less protection than other forms of
speech). Even though the Lanham Act expressly includes consideration of whether a use is
“commercial” in evaluating whether a dilution claim can be brought, the term has been in-
terpreted by most courts on constitutional grounds as meaning that only uses within com-
mercial speech can be liable for dilution. Rothman, supra note 31, at 1942-44, 1962, 1968-69.
the first amendment and the right(s) of publicity
141
pect that they will also do so in the context of right of publicity claims. Other-
wise, the reach of the tort would be radically restricted.
3. Commodities
There is yet a third tranche of communicative acts, which courts appear to
treat as if they had no First Amendment value at all. We shall call this class of
communicative acts commodities. An instructive example of courts treating
communicative acts in this way comes from outside the realm of publicity cas-
es. In the context of products liability law, aeronautical charts have been treated
as if they were devoid of any First Amendment value, even though such charts
undoubtedly convey information. When publishers of such charts are sued for
having conveyed inaccurate information causing accidents, First Amendment
defenses are irrelevant. Courts treat such charts as mere “‘products’ for the
purpose of products liability law.”238
There is an analogous phenomenon in the context of right of publicity cas-
es. Courts frequently allow regulation of “mass-produced unspecialized”239
items without acknowledging any First Amendment concerns at all. Such
claims often arise in the context of merchandise, or what one court has called
“mundane products,” in which plaintiffs’ identities appear on items like t-
shirts, coasters, and pencil sharpeners.240 Even when they are imprinted with
unique representations of celebrities’ identities, products of this kind are often
treated as if they lack constitutional or artistic value. The Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition notes:
An unauthorized appropriation of another’s name or likeness for use
on posters, buttons, or other memorabilia is thus ordinarily actionable
238. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Brocklesby v. Unit-
ed States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1985)); accord Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707
F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342-
43 (9th Cir. 1981); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71-73 (Ct. App. 1985).
239. Commodity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 250 (11th ed. 2003) (defining
“commodity” as an “economic good: [such] as . . . a mass-produced unspecialized prod-
uct”).
240. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) (conclud-
ing that “mugs, cups, . . . flags, towels, t-shirts, or any other mundane products” are treated
differently for First Amendment purposes and potentially lack any constitutional considera-
tions); see also William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the
Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 3, 14, 98 (2012) (observ-
ing that “[m]erchandising uses occupy a somewhat difficult middle ground between adver-
tising uses and traditional expressive uses,” distinguishing “coffee mugs, posters and T-
shirts” from “books, magazines, and films,” and concluding that “games are not coffee
mugs”).
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as an infringement of the right of publicity. Attempts to defend the sale
of such merchandise on [F]irst [A]mendment grounds through analo-
gies to the marketing of books, magazines, and other traditional media
of communication . . . have typically been rejected.241
A controversial example is The Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social
Change v. American Heritage Products,242 in which the Center, as the assignee of
King’s surviving right of publicity, sued American Heritage to prevent the
manufacture and sale of mass-produced plastic busts of Martin Luther King, Jr.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the Center’s claim should be allowed
under Georgia’s right of publicity, and that the use of King’s likeness on the
busts did not raise “the slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, a
thought, or an opinion, within the meaning of the constitutional provision
which guarantees to a person the right to publish his sentiments on any sub-
ject.”243
Similarly, in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., the court al-
lowed Howard Hughes to prevent “the marketing and distribution of an adult
educational career game entitled ‘The Howard Hughes Game.’”244 Although
the New York right of publicity statute is ordinarily interpreted in a manner
designed to keep the requirements of “the First Amendment in mind,”245 the
New York court concluded that defendants were merely “selling a commodity, a
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
242. 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
243. Id. at 700 (quoting Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905)).
244. 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145-46 (Sup. Ct.), aff ’d as modified, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (App. Div. 1973).
245. Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Messenger v. Gruner +
Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. 2000) (“Consistent with the statutory—
and constitutional—value of uninhibited discussion of newsworthy topics, we have time and
again held that, where a plaintiff ’s picture is used to illustrate an article on a matter of public
interest, there can be no liability under sections 50 and 51 unless the picture has no real rela-
tionship to the article or the article is an advertisement in disguise.”). We note that an idio-
syncratic line of cases in New York has rejected findings of newsworthiness when a story is
determined to be false, deceptive, or fictionalized, even in the context of what otherwise
would be classified as public discourse. See Messenger, 727 N.E.2d at 555; see also Spahn v. Jul-
ian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. 1967) (concluding that the claim against the
publisher of a biography was constitutional because the author knowingly fictionalized and
falsified events, dialogue, and thoughts); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 103 N.E. 1108,
1110-11 (N.Y. 1913) (allowing the claim by the plaintiff because the film in which he was de-
picted was a fictionalized version of true events); Porco v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., LLC, 47
N.Y.S.3d 769, 772 (App. Div. 2017) (allowing the claim against a docudrama because the tel-
evision movie’s account of real events was alleged to be “materially and substantially ficti-
tious”).
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commercial product, an entertaining game of chance,” rather than “educating
the public as to the achievements of Howard Hughes.”246
California Chief Justice Rose Bird sought to summarize the intuition be-
hind these decisions in her influential dissent in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.247
Bird argued that California’s right of publicity should be inheritable, but she
assured her readers that it would cause no “conflict with freedom of expres-
sion” when a plaintiff ’s likeness was used “in connection with the sale of such
objects as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target games, candy
dispensers and beverage stirring rods. Such conduct hardly implicates the First
Amendment.”248
It is plain, however, that not all t-shirts, coasters, and other merchandise
are mere commodities when it comes to First Amendment analysis. They can
sometimes constitute public discourse. As a federal district court observed in
Hoepker v. Kruger,
mannequins and pencil sharpeners and other such products can also
qualify as art, and museums sometimes collect and display them as
such. And case law makes clear that “First Amendment doctrine does
not disfavor nontraditional media of expression.” Courts should not be
asked to draw arbitrary lines between what may be art and what may be
prosaic as the touchstone of First Amendment protection.
. . . .
Museum gift shops sell merchandise that, in general, replicates the
art displayed in the museum, thus enabling the museum to distribute
art in a common and ordinary form that can be appreciated in everyday
life. That the art is reproduced in formats and in quantities sold for
modest sums makes the art popular, but does not change the essential
nature of the artistic expression that is entitled to First Amendment
protection.249
246. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 144 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
247. 603 P.2d 423, 434 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 449; see also Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 347 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84-85
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (finding “no validity” in the argument that “marketing [of] T-shirts, sweat-
shirts and buttons offering comical and satirical comment on ‘one Howard Hughes’” was
“protected by the constitutional right of free speech”).
249. Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 352-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted); see RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (“In some
circumstances, however, the informational content of the particular merchandise or its utili-
ty to purchasers as a means of expression may justify the conclusion that the use is protected
under the first amendment. A candidate for public office, for example, cannot invoke the
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Although there is no magic bullet that can distinguish whether a given use
occurs in a commodity, or instead in public discourse or commercial speech,
some such categorization is at the root of many right of publicity decisions. In
Aldrin v. Topps Co.,250 for example, a federal district court found that a set of
trading cards with “images of well-known American politicians, actors, ath-
letes, scientists, organizations, artifacts, and events” were neither commodities
nor commercial speech.251 The court rejected astronaut Buzz Aldrin’s claim that
a card with an image of him on the moon violated his right of publicity, con-
cluding that the cards used “Aldrin’s name in the course of conveying infor-
mation about his historically significant achievements. Furthermore, the cards
propose no commercial transaction, and are not advertisements for any prod-
uct, let alone an unrelated product. Rather . . . the speech is the product, and is
protected.”252
Aldrin should be contrasted with Hilton v. Hallmark Cards.253 In Hilton, the
Ninth Circuit considered a humorous birthday card produced by “a major na-
tional purveyor of greeting cards” that featured a photograph of celebrity Paris
Hilton’s head “super-imposed” on the body of a cartoon waitress bringing a
plate of food to a restaurant customer.254 The fictional Hilton informs the pa-
tron, “Don’t touch that, it’s hot,” which is a play on Hilton’s well-known catch-
phrase “that’s hot,” which she used on her television series The Simple Life
whenever she found “something interesting or amusing.”255 The Ninth Circuit
rejected Hallmark’s First Amendment defense as a matter of law.256 Although
the court ostensibly applied the transformative-use test,257 it seems more plau-
right of publicity to prohibit the distribution of posters or buttons bearing the candidate’s
name or likeness, whether used to signify support or opposition.”); see, e.g., Cardtoons v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding parodic baseball
trading cards protected by the First Amendment); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (rejecting a right of publicity claim for the sale of a poster with
plaintiff ’s likeness when plaintiff ran a mock campaign for presidency).
250. No. CV 10-09939 DDP (FMOx), 2011 WL 4500013 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011).
251. Id. at *1, *3.
252. Id. at *3 (emphasis omitted). The court contrasted the Topps cards to the use of test pilot
Chuck Yeager’s name in Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d. 1089 (E.D. Cal.
2009), which “constituted commercial speech because it had no informative purpose other
than to create positive associations with a brand and used Chuck Yeager’s identity to pro-
mote an unrelated product.” Aldrin, 2011 WL 4500013, at *2 (citing Yeager, 673 F. Supp. 2d at
1098-99).
253. 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010).
254. Id. at 899.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 912.
257. Id. at 909-12.
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sible that it was actually motivated by the belief that Hallmark’s use of Hilton’s
identity was a mere commodity: “Hallmark’s card is not advertising the prod-
uct; it is the product.”258 Underlying this classification lay the court’s judgment
that the Hallmark card did not constitute a contribution to public discourse—
whether about Hilton or any other topic. The card was simply a “rip-off ” of
Hilton’s identity for Hallmark’s commercial advantage.259
If the court in Aldrin regarded the astronaut trading card as a vehicle that
would prompt public discussion about “historically significant achieve-
ments,”260 the court in Hilton regarded the Hallmark birthday card as a mere
258. Id. at 905 n.7. The precise question in the case was whether Hallmark’s First Amendment
defense could be upheld as a question of law, or whether it was so fact dependent that it
could be decided only in the context of a fully developed factual record. Id. at 900. Although
it is plain that refiguring Hilton into an ironic cartoon character satisfies any ordinary un-
derstanding of artistic transformation, the court nevertheless reasoned:
Hilton’s basic contention is that Hallmark lifted the entire scene on the card
from the “Simple Life” episode, “Sonic Burger Shenanigans.” The conceit behind
the program was to place Hilton and her friend Nicole Ritchie into the life of an
aver-age person, including working for a living. In the episode, the women work
at a drive-through fast-food restaurant. They cruise up to customers’ cars on roll-
er skates and serve them their orders. True to form, Hilton occasionally remarks
that a person, thing, or event is “hot.”
Hallmark’s card, Hilton claims, is a rip-off of this episode. Hallmark main-
tains that its card is transformative because the setting is different and the phrase,
“that’s hot,” has become a literal warning about the temperature of a plate [of]
food.
To be sure, there are some differences between the waitressing Hilton does in
the “Simple Life” episode and the portrayal in Hallmark’s card. Hilton’s uniform
is different, the style of the restaurant is different (drive-through service rather
than sit-down service), and the food is different (burgers-and-fries rather than
diner-style bacon and eggs). In the card, the body underneath Hilton’s over-sized
head is a cartoon drawing of a generic female body rather than a picture of Hil-
ton’s real body. Finally, Hilton’s catchphrase appears consistently in its familiar,
idiomatic meaning. Despite these differences, however, the basic setting is the
same: we see Paris Hilton, born to privilege, working as a waitress.
. . . [T]here is enough doubt as to whether Hallmark’s card is transformative un-
der our case law that we cannot say Hallmark is entitled to the defense as a matter
of law.
Id. at 911. In the end, the Ninth Circuit rejected Hallmark’s First Amendment defense chiefly
because an ordinary reader would understand the birthday card to refer to Hilton and her
TV adventures. See id. But if such referentiality is enough to defeat a First Amendment claim
of transformative use, the test cannot perform any constitutional work at all, because such
referentiality is a necessary element for every claim of a misappropriated identity.
259. See id. at 911; supra text accompanying note 258.
260. Aldrin v. Topps Co., No. CV 10-09939 DDP (FMOx), 2011 WL 4500013, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 2011).
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commercial product lacking the purpose or effect of sparking public conversa-
tion. The difference illustrates how courts attribute constitutional significance
to particular communicative acts.261 The question is whether a court will char-
acterize the use of a person’s identity as contributing to the formation of public
opinion or to the distribution of useful information (commercial or otherwise).
If not, it is likely to classify the use as a mere commodity.262
There is no question that courts in the context of the right of publicity ac-
tually do classify certain communicative uses as public discourse, endowed
with the full panoply of First Amendment immunities; that they classify other
uses as commercial speech, accorded some but not all of these immunities; and
that they classify still other uses as commodities, given no First Amendment
protections at all. As we shall see in Section III.B, these differences have enor-
mous implications for the constitutionality of right of publicity actions.
B. The First Amendment and the Right(s) of Publicity
Each of the four branches of the right of publicity that we identified in
Part I protects a distinct state interest. In this Section we discuss how each in-
terest intersects with First Amendment values in the contexts of public dis-
course, commercial speech, and commodities.
1. The First Amendment and the Right of Performance
In Zacchini the Supreme Court exactly and forcefully analogized the state’s
interest in protecting a right of performance to the state’s interest in protecting
copyright.263 The enforcement of copyright law does not receive heightened
constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has explained that one of copyright’s main purposes is,
like that of the First Amendment itself, “to promote the creation and publica-
261. Judicial inquiry will be informed in part by social practices and conventions associated with
particular categories of objects. See Post, supra note 212, at 1253-55.
262. We will further discuss the challenges of making such distinctions in Section III.B.2. We
should also be clear that First Amendment scrutiny can be independently triggered if the
state attempts to restrict commodities for unconstitutional purposes. See id. at 1255-60. Even
if coffee mugs imprinted with the faces of celebrities were considered commodities and
hence subject to the right of publicity without constitutional restriction, First Amendment
concerns would nevertheless be raised if the state sought to prohibit only the sale of mugs
imprinted with images of celebrities opposed to the President.
263. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)).
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tion of free expression.”264 Citing Zacchini, the Supreme Court has even held
that an action for copyright can proceed against a major news magazine seek-
ing to publish an ex-President’s memoirs.265 It did not matter that the publica-
tion was newsworthy, that it involved a quintessential public figure, or that the
publication was indisputably public discourse. Absent “copyright protection in
the work of a public figure,” the Supreme Court reasoned:
[T]here would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such
memoirs, and the public would be denied an important source of sig-
nificant historical information. The promise of copyright would be an
empty one if it could be avoided merely by dubbing the infringement a
fair use “news report” of the book.266
If copyright actions apply without constitutional restriction to public dis-
course, commercial speech, and commodities, Zacchini stands for the proposi-
tion that the First Amendment will not restrict analogous assertions of the
right of performance. Zacchini itself upheld a right of performance claim
against a nightly news broadcast.267
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court has been careful
to explain that copyright enjoys relative immunity from First Amendment re-
view because “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommoda-
tions”268 that reduce its impact on communication. These accommodations in-
clude the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, which “allow[]
the public to use . . . expression itself” in ways that preserve “traditional First
Amendment safeguards” by affording “considerable ‘latitude for scholarship
and comment,’” as well as for “parody.”269
264. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
265. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985) (citing Zacchi-
ni, 433 U.S. at 575).
266. Id. at 557. The Supreme Court stated:
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas. . . .
. . . If every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a
competing publisher, . . . the public [soon] would have nothing worth reading.
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted) (quoting Lionel Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A
Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 78 (1971)).
267. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-79.
268. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
269. Id. at 219-20 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
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Insofar as the right of performance enjoys constitutional immunity in pari
materia with copyright, the right of performance must also be construed to
contain analogous “built-in First Amendment accommodations.”270 It seems
clear enough that if the First Amendment requires such accommodations in the
context of copyright, it must also require them in the context of a right of per-
formance. Such accommodations should either be read into the elements of the
tort as a matter of state common or statutory law, or they can be exogenously
imposed as a matter of First Amendment limitations.271
Because the right of performance has not been recognized as such, it has yet
to receive the kind of discriminating common-law and statutory attention that
caused copyright to develop its own fair use jurisprudence.272 One way or an-
other, however, either through judicially imposed constitutional restraints or
through state common or statutory law, the right of performance should be
prevented from reaching uses that in the context of copyright would be exempt
from legal regulation as fair uses.273
270. Id. at 219.
271. Copyright’s fair use doctrine first developed at common law to accommodate speech inter-
ests. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
272. This fair use jurisprudence has been codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). Section 107 provides
four nonexclusive factors that courts consider when evaluating whether a defendant’s use is
fair and therefore exempt from liability. The first factor asks courts to consider “the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes.” Id. § 107(1). Uses for “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . . scholarship, or research” are more likely to be considered fair than those that
are for profit. Id. § 107; see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588; Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton,
769 F.3d 1232, 1282 (11th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court has added to this first factor con-
sideration of whether the use is a “transformative” one. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The other enumerated fair use factors include consideration of
“the nature of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2018), “the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” id. § 107(3), and
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” id.
§ 107(4). Each of these factors can, with relative ease, be imported into a fair use-style analy-
sis applicable to right of performance cases. See ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 222-23 n.29 (not-
ing that a number of scholars have taken this position); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is
Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 229-53 (1983)
(mapping out such an argument while noting some of its challenges); cf. Pamela Samuel-
son, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright
Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 915-18 (1983) (proposing use of something like copyright’s fair
use doctrine in right of publicity cases).
273. We do not say that the determination of fair use is easy. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Commen-
taries, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990) (“Judges do not share
a consensus on the meaning of fair use.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1990) (analyzing the “confusion” surround-
ing the fair use doctrine); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright’s Private Ordering and the
“Next Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1595, 1601-03 (2014) (describing some
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2. The First Amendment and the Right of Commercial Value
The muddled state of First Amendment doctrine with regard to the right of
publicity is especially benighted in the context of the right of commercial value.
That is why we have taken pains to distinguish three distinct kinds of injuries
that the right of commercial value may seek to vindicate. We denominated the
first as confusion, the object of which is to prevent uses that impair the commer-
cial value of a plaintiff ’s identity by misleading as to source or sponsorship. We
denominated the second as diminishment, the object of which is to prevent uses
that might reduce the commercial value of a plaintiff ’s identity through over-
exposure or tarnishment. We denominated the third as unjust enrichment, the
object of which is to prevent the unfair commercial misappropriation of the
commercial value of another’s identity.274
First Amendment analysis should differ depending on which of these three
injuries the right of commercial value seeks to vindicate. First Amendment
scrutiny should also differ depending on the kind of communication at issue in
the allegedly tortious use. If a defendant violates a plaintiff ’s right of commer-
cial value in the context of a use deemed to be a mere commodity, for example,
the Constitution will (by definition) impose no constitutional restraints on a
plaintiff ’s efforts to vindicate injuries to the commercial value of her identity
caused by any of these three kinds of harms. Uses that occur in the context of
public discourse or commercial speech, by contrast, require more extended
analysis.
We suggested in Section I.B that right of commercial value claims based on
diminishment and unjust enrichment ought, as a matter of state law, to reach only
unauthorized uses that occur in the context of either commodities or commer-
cial speech.275 But should state law overreach and apply these claims to public
discourse, courts should face no great First Amendment difficulty in rejecting
such claims as constitutionally prohibited. This is because it is fundamentally
incompatible with the basic structure of public discourse to seek to vindicate
the harms that diminishment and unjust enrichment are designed to remedy.
Diminishment actions seek to maintain the commercial value of those
whose identities are already well known in the marketplace.276 This value ulti-
mately depends on the attitudes of third parties. The First Amendment prohib-
practical challenges that accrue from uncertainty in the fair use doctrine). Our claim is rather
that a doctrine of fair use should be applied in the context of the right of performance and
that the doctrine should be interpreted in pari materia with the application of fair use in
copyright.
274. See supra Section I.B.3.
275. See supra notes 105-108, 110-111 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
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its the state from controlling what people think in public discourse. Diminish-
ment plaintiffs likely qualify as public figures, about whom public discussion
must be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”277 The Constitution does not
permit the state to truncate the public assessment of public figures merely be-
cause persons wish to talk “too much” about them and hence to overexpose
their identities. Nor does it permit the state to maintain the reputation of pub-
lic figures whom the public wishes to denigrate by associating their identities
with unsavory connections. As is said in the context of trademark dilution:
“[T]he trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse
whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-
identifying function.”278
Actions for unjust enrichment seek to compensate plaintiffs for the “unfair”
appropriation of the commercial value of their identity. The premise of such
actions is that a defendant ought to pay fair market value for the privilege of
using a plaintiff ’s identity, even though that identity is otherwise public.279
Public discourse, however, is a domain in which “speech that merely communi-
cates readily available public information” is constitutionally protected.280
Unlike copyright (and the right of performance), which allocates owner-
ship of particular, discrete expressions, unjust enrichment purports to give per-
sons rights to control the use of public information itself, including the simple
facts of a plaintiff ’s name or likeness. But the First Amendment requires that in
public discourse the public be constitutionally entitled to discuss whatever
public information comes to its attention, including the names and images of
277. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
278. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Jessica Litman,
Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718, 1731-
35 (1999) (arguing that trademark holders should not be able to control the meaning and
“atmospherics” of their marks beyond their informative source-identifying function).
279. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1992).
In an effort to explain the nature of this right, it has been argued that the “unjust enrich-
ment argument . . . presumes that someone must have property rights in the value” of a per-
sona. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 63, at 1182.
280. Polinsky v. Bolton, No. A16-1544, 2017 WL 2224391, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017); see
also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975) (holding that the press cannot
be sanctioned for publishing true information disclosed in public court records); C.B.C.
Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th
Cir. 2007) (holding that a producer of fantasy-baseball games cannot be sanctioned for us-
ing in its games the names and statistics of players that are available in the public domain).
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persons. It contradicts the constitutional function of public discourse to make
speakers pay for this privilege.281
The First Amendment thus properly prevents unjust enrichment claims
from reaching either the photographer who makes art out of an image of peo-
ple captured on the street,282 or the writer who discusses real people in a nov-
el.283 Participants in public discourse have a constitutional right to “take the
raw materials of life—including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or ex-
traordinary—and transform them into art, be it articles, books, movies, or
plays.”284
In contrast to actions for diminishment or unjust enrichment, actions for
confusion do not effectuate a purpose that is fundamentally incompatible with
the structure of public discourse. On the whole, public discourse is improved if
the public is not misled about whether a particular person is the source of a
particular use of their identity or has sponsored such a use. It serves no one’s
interest if a political candidate can with impunity mislead the public into think-
ing that he has been endorsed by a particular celebrity.285 “The purchaser of a
book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the
source of the product.”286
Confusion actions serve analogous purposes to trademark and unfair com-
petition claims that regulate communications that are likely to cause confusion
about a mark or an endorsement.287 Although such claims are most often
brought in the context of commercial speech, they are also brought against in-
fringing uses within public discourse.288 But because all state regulation of
281. See Haglund v. Sawant, 781 F. App’x 586, 588-90 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting on First
Amendment grounds a right of publicity claim arising out of the use of a landlord’s name as
the title of legislation protecting tenants).
282. See, e.g., Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 50171(U), 2006 WL 871191, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
8, 2006), aff ’d, 878 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 2007).
283. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1994).
284. Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 2016).
285. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1070-72 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
286. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989).
287. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2018).
288. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918-21 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Hold-
ings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 663-68 (5th Cir. 2000); King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824,
829-31 (2d Cir. 1992); Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F.
Supp. 1546, 1553-54 (S.D. Fla. 1990). But see Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 540-41
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (contending that the Lanham Act is limited to uses in commercial speech);
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (same). For further discussion,
see Rothman, supra note 31, at 1937-45, 1989-92.
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public discourse is potentially problematic, it is also well recognized that such
claims create an obvious tension with the First Amendment.
In the context of applying the Lanham Act, courts have therefore properly
fashioned distinctive First Amendment doctrine to mediate “the tension be-
tween the protection afforded by the Lanham Act to trademark owners and the
protection afforded by the First Amendment to expressive activity.”289 The pre-
cise wording of the doctrine differs, but in one way or another, courts have
sought to ensure that “the finding of likelihood of confusion must be particu-
larly compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interest.”290
This is the point of the widely adopted test developed in Rogers v. Grimaldi
in the context of false endorsement claims.291 Fearing that an “overextension of
Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment
values,” the court in Rogers held that the Lanham Act ought to be applied “only
where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression.”292 Such an occurrence will be rare and only allowed
when the speaker “explicitly mislead[s] consumers. ‘[T]he slight risk
that . . . use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly suggest endorsement or
sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the danger of restricting artistic
expression, and [in cases where there is no explicit misleading] . . . the Lanham
Act is not applicable.’”293
289. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664.
290. Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993); see Univ. of
Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have no
hesitation in joining our sister circuits by holding that we should construe the Lanham Act
narrowly when deciding whether an artistically expressive work infringes a trademark.”);
Sugar Busters, LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Twin Peaks
Prods., 996 F.2d at 1379).
291. Rogers, 875 F.2d 994.
292. Id. at 998-99; see also Girl Scouts of the U.S. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc.,
808 F. Supp. 1112, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the Rogers test in the context of fictional
children’s books). The Rogers test has been expanded to apply beyond titles and is applicable
to the substance of all works deemed “expressive.” See New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d at 1275-79
(applying the Rogers test to allow the use of plaintiff ’s marks within paintings, prints, and
calendars); E.S.S Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099-1101 (9th
Cir. 2008) (applying the Rogers test in the context of video games); ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at
937 (applying the Rogers test to the use of an athlete’s name in material accompanying prints
that depicted the athlete); see also VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170,
1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the Rogers test applies to a dog toy because the “Bad
Spaniels Silly Squeaker” toy is an expressive work that “communicates ‘a humorous mes-
sage,’ using word play to alter the serious phrase that appears on a Jack Daniel’s bottle—‘Old
No. 7 Brand’—with a silly message—‘The Old No. 2’” (citation omitted)).
293. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-
1000). Notably, the same court that recognized a First Amendment defense to a false en-
dorsement claim under the Lanham Act in Brown rejected one in the context of the very
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Analogous constitutional considerations should apply to confusion-based
right of publicity claims in the context of public discourse. The legitimate state
purpose of preventing confusion must be balanced against the potential
chilling effects of any effort to regulate public discourse. The upshot is that, as
in Lanham Act and related state claims, First Amendment considerations
should prevent confusion-based claims from proceeding within public dis-
course unless there is very strong evidence that a speaker has seriously or per-
haps explicitly misled the public as to a plaintiff ’s participation in, or sponsor-
ship of, the allegedly infringing use.
No such tight restrictions on confusion-based claims are required in the
context of commercial speech. Because commercial speech is protected primari-
ly due to its “informational function,” the Supreme Court has been quite clear
that “there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”294
Claims of confusion precisely allege that identities have been misappropriated
in ways that are likely to mislead the public about source or sponsorship.
Hence there is no question of their constitutionality when applied in the do-
main of commercial speech, just as there is no question of the enforcement of
analogous claims under the Lanham Act.
Even in the context of commercial speech, however, trademark and unfair
competition laws accommodate free speech concerns. These laws have long tol-
erated some degree of confusion when a defendant has acted in good faith and
fairly to describe its own goods or services, or to comment on another’s prod-
uct when doing so requires reference to a mark or a common term or sym-
bol.295 Right of commercial value claims should similarly allow defenses that
track the descriptive and nominative fair use defenses to Lanham Act claims.296
same video game as to a right of publicity claim brought by a different set of plaintiffs. Davis
v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). This led the plaintiff in Brown to refile his
complaint in state court with a right of publicity claim, which the court allowed to proceed.
Complaint at 1, Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. BC 520019 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug.
30, 2013); Darren Rovell, Jim Brown Receives $600,000 Judgment to Dismiss Lawsuit vs. EA,
ESPN (June 28, 2016), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/16589853/jim-brown-gets-
600000-dismiss-lawsuit-electronic-arts [https://perma.cc/6YSM-VG25].
294. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
295. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2018); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118-23 (2004); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130-31
(1947); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938); New Kids on the Block
v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1992).
296. Descriptive or “classic” fair use is a defense when a defendant uses a term or symbol “fairly
and in good faith” to describe aspects of its own goods or services. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(4); KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 118-23. Nominative or referential fair use
allows the use of another’s mark to “accommodate[] situations where it would be ‘virtually
impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of
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Although these defenses are internal to trademark law, they are recognized as
the kind of “built-in First Amendment accommodations”297 without which
there would be “serious First Amendment concerns” about the enforcement of
the Lanham Act.298 These fair use defenses should also apply to diminishment
and unjust enrichment claims.299
Absent the applicability of fair use defenses, diminishment and unjust en-
richment claims are otherwise likely valid in the context of commercial speech.
Under Central Hudson, restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional so
long as “the asserted governmental interest is substantial” and so long as “the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and . . . is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”300 In the context of
commercial speech, many would characterize the maintenance of the commer-
cial goodwill of public figures as a substantial government interest. Diminish-
reference or any other such purpose without using the mark.’” Am. Soc’y for Testing v. Pub-
lic.Resource.Org., Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting New Kids on the Block,
971 F.2d at 306). To establish the fairness of such referential uses a defendant must establish
that: (1) “the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use
of the trademark”; (2) “only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service”; and (3) the defendant “must do noth-
ing . . . [to] suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” New Kids on the
Block, 971 F.2d at 308. In the context of the right of commercial value, the plaintiff ’s identity
would substitute for the plaintiff ’s trademark in a fair use analysis. These defenses apply to
uses in both commercial and noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Sazerac Brands, LLC v. Peri-
style, LLC, 892 F.3d 853, 855, 857-59 (6th Cir. 2018); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332
F.3d 915, 918, 920-21 (6th Cir. 2003); New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308; see also Am.
Soc’y for Testing, 896 F.3d at 456 (“A prototypical example of nominative fair use would be
where ‘an automobile repair shop specializing in foreign vehicles runs an advertisement us-
ing the trademarked names of various makes and models to highlight the kind of cars it re-
pairs.’” (citations omitted)).
297. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (concluding that analogous accommodations
are what allow for copyright law’s constitutionality).
298. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010); see also
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2003) (suggesting that dilution
claims adequately accommodate First Amendment concerns because they exempt “non-
commercial use[s]” and provide “fair use” defenses); Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1270 and H.R. 1295 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 128 (1995)
(statement of Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice President, International Trademark Associa-
tion) (suggesting that dilution law would be unconstitutional if applied to noncommercial
speech). Frequently courts employ fair use doctrines on a theory of constitutional avoidance
instead of engaging in direct First Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 808 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).
299. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2018) (providing expressly for such defenses in the context of
dilution).
300. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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ment directly advances this goal by empowering plaintiffs to exercise effective
control over commercial uses of their identity. So limited, diminishment ac-
tions do not seem overbroad. Many would also consider it a substantial gov-
ernment interest to prevent the “unfairness” that unjust enrichment seeks to
avert in the context of unauthorized uses of a person’s identity in commercial
speech. Unjust enrichment directly advances this interest in a narrowly tailored
manner.
Although both diminishment- and unjust enrichment-based right of pub-
licity claims decrease the amount of information circulated in commercial
speech,301 they each correspond to deep-seated concepts of commercial propri-
ety, and they each have substantial precedential support in the history of Amer-
ican commercial regulation. Diminishment claims are essentially analogous to
trademark dilution claims, which courts have thus far accepted as constitution-
al in the context of commercial speech.302 Diminishment claims, however, can
be brought only by celebrities who are well known. Actions for unjust enrich-
ment ensure that ordinary persons, whose names and images are without inde-
301. An argument might be made that although diminishment claims reduce the quantity of in-
formation that circulates, they nevertheless increase the quality of that information for con-
sumers because they preserve the distinctiveness of a plaintiff ’s identity. An analogous ar-
gument has been advanced in the context of trademark dilution claims. See LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 68, at 207-09; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:
An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 306-08 (1987) (discussing a number of eco-
nomic arguments posited for dilution laws). But this justification for dilution law has been
met with skepticism and empirical challenges. See, e.g., Beebe et al., supra note 102; Tushnet,
supra note 102.
302. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 430-31; see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 735-36 (2012)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting the constitutionality of trademark dilution laws “fo-
cused upon commercial and promotional activities that are likely to dilute the value of a
mark”); id. at 743-44 (Alito, J., dissenting) (pointing to dilution law as constitutionally al-
lowable because it protects the “prestige associated with fancy watches and designer hand-
bags” by preventing the “lessening [of] the distinctiveness” of marks (citation omitted)); cf.
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm’n, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding constitu-
tional a prohibition on the use of the term “Olympics” without regard to likely consumer
confusion). We note that some scholars have been skeptical about dilution’s constitutionali-
ty. See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56
HOUS. L. REV. 401, 456-61 (2018); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Proper-
ty: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 732-39
(2003). For discussion of constitutional challenges to tarnishment-based dilution claims
after Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), and Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019), see
Jennifer E. Rothman, Valuing the Freedom of Speech and the Freedom to Compete in Defenses to
Trademark and Related Claims in the United States, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE TRADEMARK LAW 537, 553-55 (Irene Calboli & Jane C. Ginsburg
eds., 2020). To the extent that dilution law is unconstitutional in the trademark context it
should be equally problematic in the context of diminishment-based right of publicity
claims.
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pendent market value, are also able to control commercially valuable uses of
their identities. Unjust enrichment actions thus eliminate the striking unfair-
ness of permitting famous persons, but not others, to control commercially
valuable appropriations of their identity. If diminishment actions are permitted
within commercial speech, eliminating this inequity is likely itself a sufficient
constitutional justification for unjust enrichment claims.
The conclusions we have reached so far with respect to the likely constitu-
tional treatment of right of commercial value claims are summarized in Table 1:
TABLE 1.





















Table 1 suggests that the constitutionality of right of commercial value
claims depends to a great extent on judicial determinations of whether uses oc-
cur in public discourse, commercial speech, or commodities. Standard First
Amendment doctrine is, however, not very helpful in assisting courts in mak-
ing such essential constitutional judgments.
The foundational precedent for identifying commodities is Spence v. Wash-
ington, which would have courts characterize as “protected expression” any “ac-
tivity” in which “an intent to convey a particularized message [is] present, and
in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”303 In every right of commercial
value claim, however, a defendant will by hypothesis have successfully commu-
nicated a plaintiff ’s identity. In the context of the right of commercial value,
therefore, the Spence test cannot discriminate between commodities and public
discourse or commercial speech.304 Although there is doctrine that purports to
303. 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). For a discussion, see Post, supra note 212, at 1250-60.
304. For other recent judicial efforts to draw this line, see, for example, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1742-44 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring),
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instruct courts how to distinguish commercial speech from public discourse,305
such doctrine is generally conceded to be vague and unhelpful, and assuredly is
of little assistance in helping courts evaluate the myriad different communica-
tive contexts in which right of commercial value claims are embedded.306
Given the nearly infinite ways in which the names and images of persons
can be communicated, courts dealing with actions for the right of commercial
value are virtually at sea in distinguishing the three distinct constitutional
tranches of communication that we have identified. It is no surprise, then, that
courts have struggled to fashion doctrine that implicitly categorizes the consti-
tutional nature of the speech at issue in right of commercial value cases.
Consider the many decisions in which courts have addressed the mass pro-
duction and sale of unauthorized commercial posters. Such posters, particularly
when depicting celebrities, are often evaluated as if their restriction raised no
constitutional issues.307 In Brinkley v. Casablancas,308 for example, the model
Christie Brinkley objected to the unauthorized mass production and sale of
posters reproducing a photograph of her that originally had been taken with
permission. A New York court discerned nothing of a “newsworthy” nature
within the poster and saw no constitutional difficulty in finding a violation of
the New York right of publicity statute.309
in which Justice Thomas asserts that a custom wedding cake is expressive speech, rather
than a mere product; and Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 909 (Ariz.
2019), which treats custom wedding invitations as fully protected “pure speech.”
305. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-68 (1983); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-69 (1976).
306. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1999), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d
1208 (9th Cir.), and on reh’g, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); Dryer v. Nat’l Football League,
689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 (D. Minn. 2010).
307. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(“[T]here is no [First Amendment] protection for selling posters of Elvis Presley as Elvis
Presley.”), rev’d on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802-03 (Cal. 2001) (rejecting a First Amendment defense in the
context of the sale of the defendant’s lithograph of the Three Stooges in multiple copies and
on t-shirts). But see infra note 316.
308. 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1981).
309. See id. at 1008-09, 1011-12 (distinguishing the case from one in which an actor’s photograph
in the nude was reprinted in an adult magazine because that use was a “newsworthy” com-
ment on the plaintiff ’s willingness to appear nude in a motion picture); see also Titan Sports,
Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that pull-out
posters in a magazine of professional wrestlers would not “automatically” receive “[F]irst
[A]mendment protection” or be considered “newsworthy” under the New York statute if
they were a “separate product”).
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Contrast Brinkley with Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia,310 in which a different New
York court held that the right of publicity could not apply to an unauthorized
photograph taken of an anonymous person on a street. Even though the pho-
tographer sought to sell the picture at a commercial art gallery for “between
$20,000 and $30,000,” the court opined that “photograph[y] is ‘art,’” and “art
cannot constitutionally be within the protection of New York’s privacy laws be-
cause it is constitutionally protected speech.”311
The difference between Nussenzweig and Brinkley is consequential but mys-
terious. It turns on whether courts classify a use as public discourse (“art”) or
instead as commercial speech or a commodity. Our analysis suggests that the
right of commercial value can apply to commercial speech or commodities, but
not to public discourse (unless the use happens to create serious confusion).
But both the poster in Brinkley and the photograph in Nussenzweig were sold in
a commercial marketplace. Both pass the Spence test. How might they be con-
stitutionally distinguished from one another?
The influential transformative-work test that we discussed in Part II is best
interpreted as an effort to distinguish art from commodities (or commercial
speech) by ascertaining the “transformative” presence of an artist. But once we
realize that the larger purpose of any such test is to determine the constitution-
al value of particular communicative acts, we can also see that the doctrine is
woefully inadequate. As the New York court rightly observed in Nussenzweig,
the category of art cannot be limited “to transformative and not duplicative
likenesses,”312 or the entire field of photography could never qualify as public
discourse, which it plainly does.313
310. No. 50171(U), 2006 WL 871191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006), aff ’d, 878 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y.
2007).
311. See id. at *4, *6; see also Altbach v. Kulon, 754 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711-12 (App. Div. 2003)
(“[A]rtistic expressions . . . are entitled to protection under the First Amendment and ex-
cepted from New York’s privacy protections . . . . In addition to the so-called ‘newsworthi-
ness’ exception . . . there is a well-recognized exception for works of art and ‘advertising that
is undertaken in connection with a use protected by the First Amendment.’” (citation omit-
ted)). For an analogous contrast to that between Brinkley and Nussenzweig, compare Young v.
Grenerker Studios, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 357-58 (Sup. Ct. 1941), which allowed liability when
an authorized image of a model made by an anonymous artist was used without consent by
defendant manufacturer to produce mass-distributed “manikins,” with Simeonov v. Tiegs,
602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016-18 (Civ. Ct. 1993), which concluded that the First Amendment
barred liability when an internationally known sculptor made an unauthorized bust of a fa-
mous model, even if he sold it in multiple copies for profit, because it was the artist’s “crea-
tive expression.”
312. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 871191, at *7-8.
313. We note that although the transformative-work test, as broadly defined by the California
Supreme Court, appears to allow for this, the narrower interpretations of that law by the
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The fundamental difficulty is that courts cannot distinguish among public
discourse, commercial speech, and commodities by using any simple or me-
chanical “test.” Right of commercial value cases present so many distinct con-
figurations that the necessity of discrete, contextualized judicial judgment is
unavoidable. The essential point is that the constitutional classification of
communicative acts ultimately depends upon the attribution of constitutional
value. If a court believes that a particular communicative act should be charac-
terized as a contribution to the process of public opinion formation, it will clas-
sify the use as public discourse.
When uses appear in a traditionally recognized “medium for the communi-
cation of ideas,”314 such as fine art, film, newspapers, radio, or books, courts are
comfortable classifying them as presumptively public discourse.315 But the
boundaries of these categories are anything but obvious. A photograph sold in
a gallery as fine art will be accorded the constitutional dignity of public dis-
course, but a photograph sold on the mass market as a commercial poster is
less likely to be accorded the same respect.316 Although the Supreme Court has
held that video games should be classified as a protected “medium” for the
communication of ideas,317 lower courts have evidently struggled with this
conclusion in the context of the right of publicity, sometimes treating uses in
Third and Ninth Circuits do not. See supra notes 175-183 and accompanying text. In practice,
the transformative-work test has disfavored realistic depictions.
314. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
315. Post, supra note 212 passim (describing the concept of a medium for the communication of
ideas, which includes film, parades, art exhibitions, and so on).
316. The attribution of constitutional value is a difficult and contextual problem even in the con-
text of commercial posters. In Rosa & Raymond Parks Institute for Self Development v. Target
Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1263-65 (M.D. Ala. 2015), aff ’d on other grounds, 812 F.3d 824 (11th
Cir. 2016), for example, the court considered a mass-produced plaque of Rosa Parks sold at
Target to be “newsworthy or of legitimate public concern” and “protected by the First
Amendment” because it celebrated Parks and her role in the civil rights movement. Similar-
ly, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2000), aff ’d on
other grounds, 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), the more than 5,000 “limited edition” copies of a
print of Tiger Woods sold by a sports artist were deemed “to convey a message” of Woods’s
winning the Masters Tournament, rather than merely to “reproduce an existing photograph”
of Woods. In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 642-43 (1995), a
poster of legendary 49ers quarterback Joe Montana was classified as “newsworthy” because
it reproduced a front-page photograph and headline celebrating the team’s Super Bowl vic-
tory.
317. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (holding that video games are a
protected “medium” that qualifies “for First Amendment protection. . . . Like the protected
books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even
social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot,
and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction
with the virtual world)”).
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video games as if they were in commodities or commercial speech. Judicial un-
certainty about exactly how to characterize the recent genre of video games may
help explain why several recent controversial decisions have rejected First
Amendment defenses in the context of such games.318
Difficulties of constitutional categorization become especially complicated
when uses occur outside of traditional media, as for instance on t-shirts or
coffee mugs. Perhaps uniquely among state torts, right of publicity cases in-
volve a plethora of such nontraditional uses. In the context of classifying com-
munications that do not presumptively form part of public discourse, the es-
sential constitutional question facing a court will be whether a reasonable
person would expect the relevant communicative act (if, for example, imprint-
ed on an object) to be taken up and used in the kind of communicative ex-
changes that the First Amendment is designed to protect. A prerequisite for
such exchanges is the potential for dialogue. The constitutional categorization
of a use on a coffee mug will not be determined by the mug itself, considered in
isolation, but rather by how a court determines that the communicative content
imprinted on the mug will be perceived and deployed in society.319 Similarly,
constitutional protections do not attach to a photograph as such, but to how a
court imagines the photograph will be regarded and used by its audience.
A distinct constitutional difficulty with which courts have grappled in right
of publicity cases is what we might call the issue of severability. This issue arises
in the context of uses related to, but potentially separable from, works that
themselves would be categorized as public discourse. Consider, for example,
the “relatedness” test set forth in Rogers v. Grimaldi, which we discussed in Part
II.320 We suggest that the test is best interpreted as an effort to determine
318. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 148-49, 167-70 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA Stu-
dent-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Champion v. Take Two Interactive Software, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.3d 838, 847-48 (Sup. Ct. 2019)
(distinguishing narrative video games from sports-themed ones for analyzing the meaning
of New York’s speech-inflected requirement that liability only lie for uses for “purposes of
trade”). Courts may sometimes be inclined to analogize video games to board games instead
of to movies. On the uncertain judicial treatment of board games in the context of the right
of publicity, see, for example, Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970);
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967); and Rosemont En-
terprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But see C.B.C. Distrib.
& Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 819 (8th Cir.
2007) (holding that the First Amendment protects use of athletes’ names and statistics in
fantasy sports); Aldrin v. Topps Co., No. CV 10-09939 DDP (FMOx), 2011 WL 4500013, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (allowing a First Amendment defense in the context of a trad-
ing-card game).
319. See Post, supra note 212, at 1252-55.
320. See 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989); supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
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whether the title of a film might constitutionally be characterized in a manner
that is distinct from the film to which it is attached.
The question in Rogers was whether the use of Ginger Rogers’s name in the
title of a movie could be actionable. The movie was itself plainly public dis-
course, but the issue was whether the title could be regulated apart from the
movie. Rogers held that unless the name bore “no artistic relevance to the un-
derlying work whatsoever,”321 or could be characterized as a “disguised adver-
tisement for the sale of goods or services or a collateral commercial product,” it
ought to receive the same public discourse protections as the movie itself.322
The issue of severability turns on whether courts can isolate uses of identity
in what is otherwise public discourse and regulate them as if they were com-
mercial speech or commodities.323 Missouri’s predominant-purpose test, which
we discussed in Part II, seems to us an unsuccessful effort to do exactly this.324
321. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. Although this language is taken from the court’s analysis of the First
Amendment defense to Rogers’s Lanham Act claim, we think it well describes the principle
invoked by the court in its discussion of the right of publicity when it indicated that the use
of the title was constitutionally protected unless “wholly unrelated” to the underlying work.
See id. at 1004-05.
322. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-1000, 1004-05 (considering First Amendment defenses to both Lan-
ham Act and state publicity claims); cf. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35
F. Supp. 2d 727, 732, 734-35 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that because “New Line’s proposed ti-
tle is not being used primarily as part of an expressive work, but instead is used ‘to market,
advertise or identify’ the film . . . no such artistic concept inheres in the proposed title,” and
because “somewhat lesser protection” attaches to “commercial speech” than to films, “the
balance between the public’s interest in free expression and its interest in avoiding consumer
confusion and trademark dilution tilts in favor[] of avoiding confusion and dilution” (quot-
ing Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987))). In the context of
evaluating First Amendment defenses to Lanham Act claims, the Rogers test initially provid-
ed a bar to liability for uses of another’s mark or identity in titles of expressive works as long
as the uses had “some artistic relevance” and were “not explicitly misleading.” Rogers, 875
F.2d at 1000. The test has now been expanded beyond titles and applies to the substance of a
work as well. See, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2013) (rec-
ognizing the application of the Rogers test to uses within the body of works and within a
video game); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2008) (applying the test to the use of a club name in a video game); Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003) (using the test in the context of
photographs of Barbie); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003)
(applying the test to an image within an artwork).
323. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Parks’ right of publicity
claim presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding the question of whether the title to
the song is or is not ‘wholly unrelated’ to the content of the song. A reasonable finder of fact,
in our opinion, upon consideration of all the evidence, could find the title to be a ‘disguised
commercial advertisement’ or adopted ‘solely to attract attention’ to the work.” (quoting
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05)); Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 88 (2d
Cir. 1989) (“For example, Comics World could not staple a T-shirt bearing the likeness of a
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In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, Missouri concluded that the use of the hockey
player Tony Twist’s identity within a comic book that was otherwise public dis-
course could be regulated if it were “predominantly a ploy to sell comic books
and related products rather than an artistic or literary expression.”325 But this is
not a helpful criterion by which to distinguish public discourse from either
commercial speech or commodities. Biographies, documentaries, and docu-
dramas, which are paradigmatically public discourse, may well be motivated by
an interest in “exploit[ing] the commercial value”326 of a celebrity. Whether
Andy Warhol chose his celebrity subjects because their portraits were more
likely than portraits of anonymous individuals to produce commercially suc-
cessful paintings is not relevant to the question of whether his work should
constitutionally be categorized as art.
Rogers proposes what seems to us a far more defensible approach to the
question of severability within public discourse. It essentially holds that a use
will retain its “First Amendment protection” so long as its “level of relevance” is
“above zero.”327 The Rogers test is appropriate because within public discourse
“esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individu-
al to make, not for the Government to decree.”328 It is therefore inherently and
deeply problematic for a court to second-guess the relevance (artistic or other-
wise) of communicative details within public discourse. Within public dis-
course, judgments of severability ought to be reserved for only the most ex-
treme cases.
3. The First Amendment and the Right of Control
The right of control, in contrast to the right of commercial value, asserts a
state interest in maintaining the autonomy of individual personalities. The
right of control rests on the idea that when others are able to speak about us
Titan wrestler between magazine covers and claim exemption from section 51 and [F]irst
[A]mendment protection for a ‘wrestling T-shirt magazine.’”).
324. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
325. 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). In Titan Sports, the Second Circuit adopted a similar test to
determine whether the right of publicity could apply to posters stapled into the pages of a
magazine: “[T]he trial court must consider whether these photos are included primarily for
their ‘public interest aspect’ or whether whatever public interest aspect might be involved ‘is
merely incidental to [the distributors’] commercial purpose.’” 870 F.2d at 88-89 (alteration
in original) (quoting Davis v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (App. Div.
1982)).
326. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 170, at 500).
327. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1100 (interpreting the Rogers test).
328. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
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without limitation, strangers can seize “at least partial control over the meaning
associated with” our identity, and we are thereby inhibited in our ability to de-
velop as autonomous persons.329
This justification, however, is incompatible with the constitutional value of
public discourse. The essence of public discourse lies in the public’s freedom to
form its own judgments based on publicly available information. We can con-
trol what information we choose to make public, but we cannot control how
others will use that information once it has entered the public domain. The
state cannot intervene to shape how the public forms its opinion based upon
public information. The resulting “pitiless glare”330 of public attention is simp-
ly a cost of living in a world that has agreed to be governed by public opinion.
Because the right of control invests persons with discretionary authority to
regulate the communication of otherwise public information, it will be uncon-
stitutional when applied to public discourse. Insofar as a person’s identity is a
matter of public information, the state cannot create rules that constrain its use
in public discourse, except for specific, narrow, and compelling reasons, like the
possibility of serious confusion as to endorsement or participation.
It is for this reason that an expansive right of control, like that accepted in
Europe in the context of a broad “right to be forgotten,” would likely be uncon-
stitutional in the United States.331 Regulating the storage, sale, and manipula-
tion of privately held data, however, is quite different from regulating public
discussion based on otherwise public information. It is one thing to prevent
Google from selling data gathered from its surveillance of our online searches;
it is quite another to prevent Google from communicating to the general public
otherwise publicly available information on the web. Freedom of public dis-
course entails the latter, but not the former.332
329. McKenna, supra note 127, at 282; see supra notes 121-136 and accompanying text.
330. Ken Newton, The Transformation of Governance?, in NEW MEDIA & POLITICS 151, 152 (Barrie
Axford & Richard Huggins eds., 2001).
331. Post, supra note 131, at 1047-54; see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Priva-
cy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1068-70 (2000). But see COHEN, supra note 113, at 261 (suggesting that the re-
strictions on speech of Europe’s right to be forgotten are more modest); ZUBOFF, supra note
135, at 57-61, 108-12 (supporting the right to be forgotten as “essential” to preserve individu-
als’ “identity and sense of dignity,” and contending that the First Amendment arguments
marshalled by surveillance capitalists to protect their massive collection and use of data are
“antidemocratic” and counter to “First Amendment values”).
332. We realize that there is loose language in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., which states that the
“creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment.” 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011). This language could be read to say that the regula-
tion of stored data involves the regulation of public discourse. But this interpretation of Sor-
rell is overbroad. The case is better construed to mean that government may not regulate the
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The right of control may perhaps fare better when it arises in the context of
commercial speech. For purposes of argument, we accept that awarding per-
sons a right of control serves a “substantial” state interest under Central Hud-
son. The question is whether, assuming that the right of control can be applied
only to commercial speech and commodities, it nevertheless “directly advances”
the value of autonomy under Central Hudson.333 Any such constitutional calcu-
lation must determine whether the First Amendment would permit the asser-
tion of the right of control if potential damage to a plaintiff ’s personality is on-
ly de minimis because the offending use is “incidental” or “fleeting,”334 as for
example when a defendant’s advertisement contains a crowd scene that hap-
pens to include an image of a plaintiff.335
transmission of data “in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.” Id. at 578-79.
Thus, the Court in Sorrell specifically approved the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA), even though HIPAA far more strictly restrains the transmission
of information than does the Vermont law Sorrell found unconstitutional. Id. at 573. Sorrell
explicitly notes that Vermont might have followed the path of HIPAA and “advanced its as-
serted privacy interest broadly by allowing the information’s sale or disclosure in only a few
narrow and well-justified circumstances.” Id. Lower courts have interpreted Sorrell in the
more limited way we propose. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1313-14
(11th Cir. 2017) (“Florida may generally believe that doctors and medical professionals
should not ask about, nor express views hostile to, firearm ownership, but it ‘may not bur-
den the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.’” (quoting
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578-79)); Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 427, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]here is no evidence that the Michigan legislature . . . disagreed with
the message of those who use consumer identifying information.” (citing Sorrell, 564 U.S. at
578-79)); King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“[T]he
Sorrell decision largely rested on the fact that Vermont was restraining a certain form of
speech communicated by a certain speaker solely because of the State’s disagreement with
it.”); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF DATA PRIVACY § 1 reporters’ n.7 (AM. LAW INST.
2019) (noting that lower courts have construed Sorrell as holding that government may not
regulate the transmission of data “in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction”
(quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578-79)).
333. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
334. See, e.g., Stayart v. Google Inc., 710 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the con-
nection between the internet search engine’s use of the plaintiff ’s name and its commercial
purpose was “incidental” rather than “substantial”); Candelaria v. Spurlock, No. 08 Civ.
1830, 2008 WL 2640471, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) (dismissing a right of publicity claim
in part based on the incidental use exception when the plaintiff ’s appearance in defendant’s
documentary was “fleeting,” lasting for only three to four seconds); Champion v. Take Two
Interactive Software, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.3d 838, 844, 847 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (rejecting the plain-
tiff ’s right of publicity claim in part because the use, if any, of his name and likeness in a vid-
eo game was “incidental in nature” rather than “consequential”).
335. In the context of a right of control, what is sometimes called the “incidental use” exemption
or defense could, of course, also be conceived as a matter of substantive state law. See, e.g.,
MCCARTHY & SCHECHTER, supra note 65, § 7.20 (“An insignificant or fleeting use of a per-
son’s name or image in an advertisement will not trigger liability . . . .”).
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Essentially the right of control in commercial speech and commodities
would give persons a similar right as would the unjust enrichment branch of
the right of commercial value, except that an unjust enrichment claim would be
applicable only to the extent that a defendant derives some commercial value
from the unauthorized use of a plaintiff ’s identity. As the common expedient of
statutory damages suggests, it may be that a right of control is commonly
thought to “directly advance” the autonomy of personality even if it is relevant
only in the thin sliver of cases in which defendants misappropriate a plaintiff ’s
identity in commercial speech or commodities without receiving a commercial
benefit. Were a right of control to apply in the context of commercial speech,
fair use defenses, analogous to those recognized in the context of the right of
commercial value, should also be constitutionally required. No constitutional
restrictions should limit the right of control with respect to commodities.
4. The First Amendment and the Right of Dignity
The right of dignity prohibits appropriations of identity that are highly
offensive, which means appropriations that are inconsistent with forms of re-
spect essential to the integrity of personality. Long-established First Amend-
ment doctrine is quite hostile to the enforcement of such civility rules in public
discourse.336 “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”337 The Court has
thus not permitted actions for dignitary torts like false light or the intentional
infliction of emotional distress to be enforced in public discourse absent a
showing of “actual malice,” which roughly means that a plaintiff must show
that a defendant has intentionally promulgated false statements of fact.338 An
actual malice requirement in the context of the right of dignity would effective-
ly require plaintiffs to establish that defendants have used their identities in
ways that deliberately mislead the public about plaintiffs’ participation in, or
endorsement of, defendants’ offending uses.339
336. Robert C. Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 486-87, 503 (2003).
337. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011)
(citing Johnson for this proposition); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)
(“[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing
it. . . . For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain
neutral in the marketplace of ideas.”).
338. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967); see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 56 (1988).
339. See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (allowing a right
of publicity claim where the use of nude photographs in Hustler could suggest consent to
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In the context of commercial speech, the right of dignity would appear to
survive Central Hudson review. The interest served by the right is plainly sub-
stantial; it has been protected by the dignitary torts for centuries. The right di-
rectly and narrowly advances this interest. But in a recent pair of cases address-
ing federal trademark registration, the Court seems to have suggested that it
might be unconstitutional even in the context of commercial speech for the
state to suppress or simply disfavor “offensive” speech.340 Nevertheless some
members of the Court intimated that there is a constitutional difference be-
tween “a law disfavoring ‘ideas that offend,’”341 and a law that restricts or dis-
courages the use of words “that are offensive . . . because of their mode of ex-
pression, independent of any views that they may express.”342
Any such distinction ought to be irrelevant in the context of public dis-
course. As the Court noted in Cohen v. California, public discourse “is designed
and intended” to put “the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into
the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political sys-
tem rests.”343 Because “words are often chosen as much for their emotive as
their cognitive force,” the “Constitution leaves matters of taste and
style . . . largely to the individual.”344 In public discourse speakers can deploy
offensive modes of expression as well as express offensive ideas.345
Commercial speech, however, is protected primarily to safeguard the “in-
formational function” of commercial communications.346 The question is
therefore whether it is constitutionally acceptable to regulate commercial
speech to exclude or limit offensive modes of expression but nevertheless to
appear in that magazine, as well as to reflect falsely on the nature of Douglass’s sexuality);
Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d 622, 753 (Ga. 2013) (allowing a right of publicity
claim where plaintiff could be seen as “endorsing the College Girls Gone Wild video through
the use of her image”).
340. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299-2301 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763-65
(2017).
341. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751).
342. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Several Justices suggested that it would be constitu-
tional to limit the registration of marks that are “obscene, vulgar, or profane” insofar as only
the “mode of expression,” rather than the “ideas” such marks convey, would be restricted. Id.
at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see id. at
2302 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
343. 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
344. Id. at 25-26.
345. For a discussion of the reasoning behind this conclusion, see Post, The Constitutional Concept
of Public Discourse, supra note 30, at 626-33.
346. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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permit an audience to receive whatever information or ideas a speaker wishes
to convey, albeit in a manner that is not offensive. Since the right of dignity
regulates only highly offensive misappropriations of identity, it might be con-
ceptualized as regulating merely the mode of expression of commercial speak-
ers.347 Although the distinction between the manner of speech and the sub-
stance of speech is a troubled one,348 it may nevertheless explain why the right
of dignity as a remedy “for mental anguish caused by one individual to anoth-
er”349 commonly prevails within commercial speech.350 As should be apparent
at this point, right of dignity claims will be constitutional if the highly offensive
use is categorized as a commodity.
Right of dignity claims are also uniquely associated with a category of
communicative acts that we have not yet discussed, but which are, speaking
precisely, neither public discourse, nor commercial speech, nor commodities.
This category is comprised of speech acts that are regarded as so highly offen-
sive that they do not receive the constitutional protections of public discourse
even though they occur in mediums (like video) or are distributed through
media outlets (like news websites) that would otherwise presumptively be clas-
sified as public discourse. As a doctrinal matter, such speech is typically denom-
inated as speech about “matters of purely private significance,”351 which in such
contexts is contrasted to “speech on ‘matters of public concern.’”352 The Court
has not very helpfully instructed us that “[d]eciding whether speech is of pub-
347. But see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 577-78 (2011) (“[T]he State may not seek to
remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by prohibiting truthful,
nonmisleading advertisements that contain impressive endorsements or catchy jingles. That
the State finds expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden
its messengers.”).
348. See, e.g., Peter Jones, Blasphemy, Offensiveness and Law, 10 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 129, 141-43
(1980).
349. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 854 (N.Y. 1959).
350. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1992); Gabiola v. Sarid,
No. 16-cv-02076, 2017 WL 4264000, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017); Michaels v. Internet
Entm’t. Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC,
740 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Ga. 2013); Beverley v. Choices Women’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 565 N.Y.S.2d
833 (App. Div.), aff ’d, 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991).
351. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 56 (1988)).
352. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (quoting First
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 776 (1978)). The Supreme Court has defined
speech that “deals with matters of public concern . . . [as speech that relates to] ‘any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or . . . ‘is a subject of legitimate news
interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Snyder,
562 U.S. at 453 (citations omitted) (first quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983);
and then quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004)).
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lic or private concern requires us to examine the ‘content, form, and context’ of
that speech, ‘as revealed by the whole record.’”353 Speech about matters of pub-
lic concern, which receives the protections of public discourse, has been identi-
fied by the Court as “the standard in determining whether a common-law ac-
tion for invasion of privacy is present.”354 Apparently what the Court means by
this is that speech about matters of public concern is most often identified with
communications that are considered “newsworthy,” and that newsworthy
communications are typically immune from both privacy and publicity
claims.355
Although the Court has insisted that the “arguably inappropriate or contro-
versial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals
with a matter of public concern,”356 in point of fact courts sometimes classify
speech that is considered highly degrading, particularly when of a sexual na-
ture, as merely of private concern.357 Such speech can be regulated in ways that
353. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761).
354. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 n.5.
355. See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Show-
time Networks, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 418, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Bosley v. WildWetT.com,
310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 923-24 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 838. Most states
provide a newsworthiness defense or exception to right of publicity claims as a matter of
state law. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (2020) (exempting from right of publicity laws
material of “newsworthy value”); Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp.,
812 F.3d 824, 832 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan’s right of publicity law does not
apply to newsworthy uses); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 794-95 (Ct.
App. 1993) (rejecting a misappropriation of identity claim under California law because the
use was newsworthy and a matter “in the public interest”); Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109
N.E.3d 390, 393 (Ind. 2018) (recognizing Indiana’s newsworthiness exception to its right of
publicity law); Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 552 (N.Y.
2000) (describing New York’s newsworthiness exception to its statutory publicity law as be-
ing “broadly construed” and applying to “any subject of public interest”). California’s limit
on liability is typical:
[T]he tort of appropriation of name and personality, whether labeled a form of
intrusion into privacy or a publicity right, invokes constitutional protections.
“Publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the pub-
lic to know, and the freedom of the press to tell it, cannot ordinarily be actiona-
ble.”
Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Eastwood v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349 (Ct. App. 1983)).
356. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987)).
357. See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that a sex
video made by an off-duty police officer did “not qualify as a matter of public concern under
any view of the public concern test”); Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1211 (“[T]he published nude pho-
tographs were in no conceivable way related to the ‘incident of public concern’ or the current
‘drama’ [surrounding the decedent’s] death.”); Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (noting that in
the context of images of the plaintiff competing in a wet t-shirt contest, “the phrase ‘public
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would be impermissible within public discourse. Thus the wrestler Hulk Ho-
gan, a well-known public figure, famously was able to succeed in a right of
publicity action against a news outlet for publishing tapes showing him having
sex with a friend’s wife on the precise ground that the offending videos did not
“address any matter of legitimate public concern” and “the explicit content of
the Gawker Video was an exploitation of public curiosity where no legitimate
public interest exists.”358
These cases are not easy to explain. That nonobscene speech about a public
figure released through a news outlet could be stripped of the protections of
public discourse because of its offensive or indecent character is inconsistent
with canonical and explicit Supreme Court precedents, like Texas v. Johnson359
or Cohen v. California.360 Yet it is undeniable that at the margins such anoma-
lous cases exist, seemingly with the Court’s own blessing.361
In the context of privacy actions, for example, courts have long imagined
that the criteria of “legitimate concern to the public”362 and “newsworthi-
ness”363 empower them to make “a normative assessment of the ‘social value’ of
a publication.”364 Yet because the arrogation of this authority is so incompatible
or general interest’ . . . does not mean mere curiosity” (quoting Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d
243, 251 (Fla. 1948) (en banc))); see also Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 352, 393 (Ct. App. 2010) (Aronson, J., concurring) (concluding that the “dissemina-
tion of the accident-scene photographs” of the plaintiffs’ daughter’s decapitation in a car ac-
cident was not newsworthy because they served “no social value” and their “graphic facts”
and “gore” did not serve any “public purpose”).
358. Permanent Injunction ¶¶ 44, 49, Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12-012447CI-11 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016) (granting the injunction on the basis of multiple claims, including one
for the violation of Hogan’s right of publicity under Florida law); see Eriq Gardner, Hulk
Hogan Gets $115M Verdict Against Gawker at Sex Tape Trial, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 18, 2016
3:56 PM PT), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/hulk-hogan-gets-115m-verdict-
876768 [https://perma.cc/Z95J-MRBS].
359. 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
360. 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971); see, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Ca., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989) (“Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment.”).
361. See, e.g., Roe, 543 U.S. at 84. “[N]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment im-
portance . . . and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment
protections are often less rigorous.” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
362. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
363. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478-79 (Cal. 1998); Judge v. Saltz Plastic
Surgery, P.C., 367 P.3d 1006, 1012-13 (Utah 2016); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320
S.E.2d 70, 83 (W. Va. 1983).
364. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483-84 (quoting Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969)).
For a discussion, see Post, supra note 131, at 1057-61. In the context of privacy, judgments of
newsworthiness are closely intertwined with judgments of offensiveness. “The two criteria,
the yale law journal 130:86 2020
170
with basic premises of public discourse, courts have simultaneously sought as-
siduously to avoid making such assessments by ceding “considerable deference
to reporters and editors” in defining newsworthiness,365 no doubt on the or-
thodox constitutional ground that
[u]nder our system of government there is an accommodation for the
widest varieties of tastes and ideas. What is good literature, what has
educational value, what is refined public information, what is good art,
varies with individuals as it does from one generation to another. . . .
. . . [A] requirement that literature or art conform to some norm
prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our sys-
tem. . . . From the multitude of competing offerings, the public will
pick and choose. What seems to one to be trash may have for others
fleeting or even enduring values.366
Cases allowing a right of dignity to proceed in the context of speech of
merely private concern that would normally be classified as public discourse are
offensiveness and newsworthiness, are related. An individual, and more pertinently perhaps
the community, is most offended by the publication of intimate personal facts when the
community has no interest in them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of
privacy that surrounds a stranger.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th
Cir. 1993).
365. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485; see Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requi-
em for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
291, 350-56 (1983).
366. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946) (footnote omitted); see Jenkins v. Dell
Publ’g. Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958).
For present purposes news need be defined as comprehending no more than
relatively current events such as in common experience are likely to be of public
interest. In the verbal and graphic publication of news, it is clear that information
and entertainment are not mutually exclusive categories. A large part of the matter
which appears in newspapers and news magazines today is not published or read
for the value or importance of the information it conveys. Some readers are at-
tracted by shocking news. Others are titillated by sex in the news. Still others are
entertained by news which has an incongruous or ironic aspect. Much news is in
various ways amusing and for that reason of special interest to many people. Few
newspapers or news magazines would long survive if they did not publish a sub-
stantial amount of news on the basis of entertainment value of one kind or anoth-
er. This may be a disturbing commentary upon our civilization, but it is nonethe-
less a realistic picture of society which courts shaping new juristic concepts must
take into account. In brief, once the character of an item as news is established, it
is neither feasible nor desirable for a court to make a distinction between news for
information and news for entertainment in determining the extent to which pub-
lication is privileged.
Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 451 (footnote omitted).
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nevertheless a distinctly observable phenomenon in the context of right of pub-
licity actions,367 which is testament to the grip of civility rules on the judicial
imagination.368 We flag these cases because they pose a difficult conundrum of
First Amendment doctrine that persists and is likely to arise in some extreme
right of dignity actions.
conclusion
By crisply distinguishing the specific interests that the right of publicity can
be used to protect, we have sought to untangle jurisprudential puzzles that
have long afflicted courts trying to apply the right of publicity. We hope we
have clarified why in some formulations the right can be brought only in com-
mercial contexts, whereas in other formulations the right is enforceable against
uses that occur in all forms of speech; why in some accounts plaintiffs must es-
tablish the commercial value of their identity before enforcing the right, where-
as in other accounts all persons can bring right of publicity actions; or why in
some contexts the right is said to focus on market damages, whereas in other
contexts the right protects against mental anguish and emotional distress. We
can see now that the nature and elements of the right of publicity should vary
as states use it to vindicate one or another of the distinct interests that we have
identified.
Regardless of whether states ultimately choose to alter the prima facie ele-
ments of right of publicity actions, disaggregating the interests protected by
these actions provides significant guidance about how to escape the currently
tortured relationship between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.
The constitutional treatment of the tort should depend heavily upon which of
the four interests we identify is asserted in a particular case, as well as upon
whether the infringing use occurs in public discourse, commercial speech, or
commodities.369 It is plain that many of what presently pass as First Amend-
ment “tests” for right of publicity cases are in fact oblique efforts to distinguish
among these three categories of communication. These tests are inadequate be-
cause they are indirect. They do not squarely face the question of why the Con-
stitution might divide communication into these categories.
367. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009); Bosley v.
WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
368. On the “paradox of public discourse” that may explain this anomaly, see Post, The Constitu-
tional Concept of Public Discourse, supra note 30, at 642-44; and Post, supra note 131, at 1008-
09.
369. To which we might add, in the unique context of right of dignity actions, speech of purely
private concern.
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We do not imagine that our attempt to illuminate the jurisprudential and
constitutional landscape of the right of publicity will dispel all difficulties. Sig-
nificant problems will no doubt remain. Our hope, however, is that by carefully
surfacing the constitutional and policy stakes that beset the conflict between
right(s) of publicity and the First Amendment, we have sketched a map that
might substantially assist those who must navigate this obscure and tumultu-
ous terrain.
